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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT ON THE CAMPUS-JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF UNIVERSITY EXPULSIONS*
The courts have consistently upheld the validity of regulations that have
the effect of reserving to the college the right to dismiss students at any time
for any reason without divulging the reason other than its being for the
general good of the institution.... [T] he prevailing law does not require
the presentation of formal charges or a hearing prior to expulsion by the
school authorities.
U.S. District Court, Middle District of Alabama, 1960.1
[O]ur sense of justice should be outraged by the denial to students of the
normal safeguards.... [It is] shocking to find that a court supports...
[the college] in denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket.
U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1961.2
INTRODUCTION
The rights of students to freedom and justice, and the authority of universi-
ties to discipline at their discretion, have recently been disputed in a number of
significant cases involving student expulsion.3 In these cases, students, vis-A-vis
their schools, have claimed rights both to due process, including fair warning
of rules and fair hearing on specific charges, and to substantive rights, such as
freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. The universities have claimed
authority to make disciplinary rules and to adopt procedures for expulsion at
their discretion. Expulsion is the disciplinary sanction most likely to be brought
before the courts; suits for reinstatement may challenge both the procedure
imposing the sanction, and the regulation for breach of which it was imposed,
seeking civil rights injunctions or other remedies.
While investigation of the law of student discipline as a whole and as an in-
stance of the law of private governments is merited, this Comment will be
*This Comment was made possible in part through the assistance of the Academic Free-
dom Project of the United States National Student Association.
1. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 951-52 (M.D. Ala. 1960),
rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
2. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961), reversillp
186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), quoting Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process,"
70 HARv. L. REv. 1406, 1407 (1957).
3. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, reversing 34 Misc.
2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd inem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962) (civil mar-
riage) ; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), reversng 186
F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (sit-in demonstration);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 176 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (sit-in demonstra-
tion) ; Lessin v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Superior Ct., Riverside Co. (unreported)
(1962), see Record No. 7162, 4th App. Dist. Cal. (Communist speakers).
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directed primarily to problems of expulsion-the complete breach of the stu-
dent-school relationship-at the college and university level. This Comment
centers on expulsions arising from regulation of student behavior; it assumes
a common law jurisdiction. The analysis may be susceptible of extrapolation to
meet other, related, problems, such as discipline generally, or expulsion at pre-
college levels. Problems of faculty rights and problems of admission will not
be dealt with. In formulating minimum standards for judicial review of expul-
sions from schools, whether state-run or private, graduate or undergraduate,
the conflicting goals of school autonomy, procedural fairness, and the freedom
of students as citizens -will be weighed.
Concern with expulsion is merited primarily because of the effect of the
sanction and its threat to the students enrolled at institutions of higher learning
in the United States.4 Had the body of student regulations been imposed upon
these students as citizens by force of public law rather than as students by uni-
versity authority, courts predictably would have invoked basic constitutional
rights to require fairer enforcement procedures, or to strike many of the rules
down. The implied thesis of student suits is that their rights as citizens to
justice before punishment and to personal freedom are infringed equally by
school or state, whichever punishes without a fair hearing,5 or restricts their
exercise of speech, 6 or forbids them to marry in a civil ceremony.7 Such regula-
4. The October, 1961 total for all school enrollment wvas 47,708,000. 1963 NWVo= AL-
_MANAc 541. The 1961 enrollment in institutions of higher education %was 3,891,000. rd. at
539.
5. A well-considered Fifth Circuit case involves expulsion of Negro students without
hearings by an Alabama state colege for participating in, sit-in demonstrations. The U.S.
District Court held that students have no procedural or substantive rights, as long as a
school acts without malice in expelling them. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
state colleges-like all other governmental bodies-were constitutionally required to provide
procedural due process when inflicting deprivations; the court spelled out the due process
requirements for schools. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 ("M.D.
Ala. 1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd, 363 U.S. 930 (1961).
In a case growing out of similar demonstrations a Tennessee Board of Education regu-
lation required the dismissal of any student arrested and convicted ony charges "involving
personal misconduct." Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 176 (M.D. Tenn.
1961). Negro students convicted on charges growing out of a sit-in demonstration were
suspended without notice after an ex parte hearing. The District Court substituted its in-
terpretation of the school rule for that of the school and held that the civil rights nature of
the offenses precluded any automatic assumption that personal misconduct was involved.
The Court required that a hearing with prior notice be held before students be expelled.
Opinion was reserved on. any possible substantive bar against expulsion for participation
in a sit-in demonstration. Kisight, supra. Cf. the actions of Chief Judge Tuttle of the Fifth
Circuit in granting a temporary restraining order reinstating Birmingham public school
pupils who had been suspended without hearing after they had absented themselves from
school, and had been arrested, in connection with civil rights demonstrations. N.Y. Times,
May 23, 1963, p. 1, col. 7.
6. Steier, a student at Brooklyn College, had conducted a continuing campaign alleging
that the public college's supervisions of student activities was tyrannical; consequently, he
was expelled. In a suit for relief under the Civil Rights Act, Steier claimed that his rights
to due process, equal protection, and, free speech had, been infringed. The judge writing "the
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tions in themselves injure student interests; their enforcement against any in-
dividual violator imposes a special deprivation upon him. Discipline is the
criminal law of university government.8 When expulsion is imposed as the
punishment, the student suffers the loss of a status and the destruction of a set
of relationships which have unique intrinsic worth.0 If the expulsion is made
opinion of the court" stated that "the United, States District Court lacked jurisdiction over
this matter ... [because] education is a field, of life reserved to the individual states. The
only restriction the Federal Government imposes is that in the educational program no state
may discriminate against an individual because of race, color, or creed." Steler v. New
York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960).
(Although this opinion is labelled that of "the court," each of the other two judges on the
panel held that there was jurisdiction and thus, as precedent, this case stands for the exist-
ence of federal jurisdiction to review state college expulsions. As then Chief Judge Clark's
dissent notes, "This indeed is a novel doctrine. No court, ever before to my knowledge, haq
suggested [this] .. . ." Id. at 23.). The second judge, concurring, found the due process and
equal protection claims not valid on the facts, and stated, that Steier's free speech had not
been infringed, because he remained free to denounce the Brooklyn College administration.;
only his right to attend the college had been taken" away. Only the dissenting then Chief
Judge, Charles Clark, found the complaint to state a valid cause of action.
See, in support of this dissent, West Virginia State Ed. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (the second flag salute case) wherein the Supreme Court clearly held that state
schools might not expel students for exercising their freedom of expression under the first
amendment. See also Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (compulsory ROTC);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; and Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., Doc.
No. 27996 at p. 2239 (2d Cir. June 4, 1963) (limiting Steier) (semble).
7. A senior at St. John's University and a student who had finished all courses and
was awaiting his degree were expelled from the university for getting married before a
city clerk, instead of a Catholic priest. The two witnesses, both seniors, were also expelled,
All the students were Roman Catholic; St. John's University is conducted by a Roman
Catholic teaching order, but admits students of all religions and has not filed with the State
Commissioner of Education, a statutory certificate that it is a religious institution No
specific school rule prohibits civil marriages, but the catalog reserves discretionary right
to expel, in the name of "Christian education." See clause quoted at note 77 infira.
In a suit brought by three of the students for a statutory writ commanding readmission,
it was claimed that their freedom of religion and their rights to due process and fair warn-
ing had been infringed. The trial court granted the writ on the second ground, but was
reversed by divided votes in the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals. Carr v. St,
John's Univ., supra note 3.
8. See discussion at text, notes 151-52 infra.
9. [C]ertain of these diplomas are evidences of qualification for certain pursuits III
life.... The relationship created amounts to this and more; it means the establish-
ment of associations, the acquisition of friendships, the enjoyment of experiences
which become endowments of great value to the student in subsequent life-values
which are very great and which cannot be measured in dollars. The selection of one's
institution of learning is always, a matter of deep consideration and care on the part
of the parents and of the youth; it is usually made with regard, to the prospective
student's career in life; once made and followed by long attendance, it cannot with-
out serious loss be changed, and dismissal is pregnant with consequences which may
spell the ruination of a life.
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 130 Misc. 249, 253, 223 N.Y. Supp. 796, 802 (1927), reald, 224
App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).
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known to be "for cause," the imputation of grave deficiencies defames the stu-
dent. Like the convicted criminal, the student may find that the stigma of his
punishment follows him through life. By its phrasing of the notation of separa-
tion made on the student's transcript, the school can render it impossible for
the student to continue his education elsewhere,10 denying him the university
degree which has become the emblem of education expected of an ever-w.iden-
ing class and the prerequisite for an ever-increasing number of occupations.
Non-academic expulsion from graduate or professional schools is in many ways
the equivalent of a license revocation proceeding; as a result of the school's
punitive action, the door to a profession is permanently dosed. Although he
retains what knowledge he has acquired, the expelled student, after having ex-
tended effort, time and money in his studies, loses both what he has invested
towards a degree and its future value ;11 the result may be a substantial dimi-
nution of his future earning power.
12
Expulsion is not only a severe deprivation, it may also be an arbitrary one.'3
Although universities imposing the sanction often do so with care commen-
surate to its seriousness, expulsions are occasionally inflicted either without
fair procedure or to enforce rules infringing the citizen's basic rights. For ex-
ample, Syracuse University expelled Miss Anthony, a senior, after a university
10. See Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Lotw-The Right to
Jutdicial Review, 34 J. IG-HnER ED. 250, 253-55 (1963).
11. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F2d 150, 157 (1961) ; accord, Knight
v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
12. As of 1958 the average lifetime income of a male high-school graduate over 25
years old was $241,844; of someone with from one to three years of college, 1'305,395; of a
college graduate, $419,871. 1962 STATIsTicAL ABstnAct OF THE U.S. 119.
13. Responses from seventy-two state universities reporting on their own disciplinary
procedures acknowledge the following departures from what is ordinarily provided
even for petty criminal offenders:
1. Forty-three per cent do not provide students with a reasonably clear and
specific list which describes misconduct subject to discipline;
2. Fifty-three per cent do not provide students with a written statement
specifying the nature of the particular misconduct charged, and only seventeen
per cent provide such a statement at least ter days before determination of guilt
or imposition of punishment;
3. Sixteen per cent do not even provide for a hearing in cases where the
student takes exception to the charge of misconduct or to the penalty imposed;
4. Forty-seven per cent allow students or administrators who appear as wit-
nesses or who bring the charge, to sit on the hearing board if they are otherwise
a member;
5. Thirty per cent do not allow the student charged to be accompanied by
an adviser of his choice during the hearing;
6. Twenty-six per cent do not permit the student charged to questiont in-
formants or witnesses whose statements may be considered by the hearing board
in determining guilt; and even including those colleges which normally allow
some cross-examination, eighty-five per cent permit the hearing board to consider
statements by witnesses not available for cross-examination;
7. Forty-seven per cent permit the hearing board to consider evidence which
was "improperly" acquired (e.g., removed by a university employee during a
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official had spoken to her sorority sisters and concluded that she was not "a
typical Syracuse girl." The school would state no specific grounds for the ex-
pulsion, relying on a clause in its catalogue which stated:
Attendance at the University is a privilege and not a right. In order to
safeguard those ideals of scholarship and that moral atmosphere which are
in the very purpose of its founding and maintenance, the University re-
serves the right and the student concedes to the University the right to
require the withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed
sufficient to it, and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need be
given. 14
Attempts to curb student political activity are sometimes masked by an asser-
tion that the university has a privilege to be arbitrary. The University of
California, for example, along with many other colleges, has enacted a rule
limiting student prerogatives of speech and assembly by prohibiting students
from inviting Communists to speak at on-campus meetings, even if satisfactory
arrangements are made for policing, scheduling, and exclusion of non-stu-
dents.15 The rule was adopted by University officials despite an earlier state
supreme court decision holding invalid, on first amendment principles, similar
limitations on meetings held by civic groups in public school buildings.10 Yet,
in this case as well as Miss Anthony's, the court upheld the school's asserted
right to act.
Courts have long acknowledged jurisdiction over suits challenging expulsion
of students from universities."7 But, rather than attempting to delineate the
proper scope and standards for judicial review, the courts have stated their
resolution of these conflicting interests in terms of the conclusory categories
and ambiguous norms of a formless body of case-law. After setting forth these
categories and norms, and demonstrating the unusual freedom which they
allow the courts, the Comment will analyze the institutions and events neces-
sarily involved, in an attempt to evolve a coherent approach for courts to take.
search of a student's room in the absence of some emergency justifying such a
procedure.
Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
368, 368-69 (1963). See ACLU, infra note 184, at 10-11. Compare UNITED STATES NATIONAL
STUDENT ASSOCIATION, CAMPUS JUSTICE (n-d.). See notes 164, 165 infra.
14. See Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435, 438
(1928), reversing 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y. Supp. 796 (1927).
15. Petition for writ of mandate to school officials preventing enforcement of the rule
denied, without opinion. Lessin v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Superior Ct., Riverside Co.
(unreported) (1962), see Record No. 7162, 4th App. Dist. Cal. See N.Y. Times, May 11,
1963, p. 13, col. 2. The university has since rescinded its rule. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1963,
p. 25, col. 5.
16. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536 (1946).
17. See Commonvealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 2 Pa. County Ct. 459 (1886), 3 Pa.
County Ct. 77 (1887) ; People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun.
107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct.), affd nem., 128 N.Y. 621 (1891) ; Booker v. Grand Rapids
Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); see also Annot. 39 A.L.R. 1019
(1925) ; Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1497 (1927) ; Annot. 58 A.L.R. 2d 903 (1958).
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PAT I
TiE LAW OF STUDENT DISCIPLINE
Courts can be called upon to decide the propriety of college expulsions in
suits for reinstatement through mandamus, specific performance, statutory
decree, declaratory judgment, or injunction under the civil rights statutes, and
in actions for damages sounding in contract or tort.'8
Although acknowledging their jurisdiction, however, courts have seemed un-
willing to create that set of standards necessary to solve the problems of
discipline suits.'9 This reluctance is reflected in the rarity with which student
suits prevail. The courts assign such reasons for it as the supposed undermin-
ing of school authority that outside review would cause, the expected great
number and small importance of student complaints, the relative advantage of
schools over courts in appraising a student's overall conduct, and the delicacy
of the matters considered.20 But the most important explanation given by the
courts for this reluctance effectively to review the colleges' decisions is hardly
separable from the basic reason for allowing those decisions to be made by the
college initially-an acknowledgment that the college's discretion in these mat-
ters has been established by age-old custom.21 In recognizing the "discretion"
customary to colleges, however, the courts rarely distinguish between the
principle that the college may make its decision without fixed rules, and the
principle that courts will allow great latitude to the college's decision on review.
Sources of School Authority
Several legal theories compete for acceptance as explanations of the source
of college authority to discipline students; each theory suggests built-in limita-
tions on college power which may have important influence on the scope of
judicial review. That the teacher stands in place of the parent-in loco parentis
-with the same power to control and punish, is one of the oldest and most
18. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, supra note 17;
see also Harker, The Use of Mandamus to Compel Educational Institutions to Confer
Degrees, 20 YAIr L.J. 341 (1911) ; Pennypacker, Mandanus to Restore Academic Priki-
leges, 12 VA. L. Rxv. 645 (1926). Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1019 (1925); Barker v. Bryn Mawr
College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 220 (1923) (specific performance) ; Carr v. St. John's Univ.,
34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S2d 403, rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd meie.,
12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962) (statutory writ); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (review under the statu-
tory provision for civil rights suits, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1958)) ; Miami Military In-
stitute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y. Supp. 799 (1962) (contract damages); John B.
Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 FLa. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (tort).
19. "The usual qualification, that dismissal must not be arbitrary, in bad faith, or in
abuse of discretion remains largely undefined." Note, 35 COLUm. L. Rsv. 898, 899 (1935).
20. See, e.g., Woods v. Simpson, 126 Atl. 882, 146 Md. 547 (1924). Steier v. New York
State Commissioner of Educ., 271 F.2d 13, 18 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960).
21. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ("com-
mon law of schools"); Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739
(1902) ("inherent" power).
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common explanations of disciplinary authority.22 Much of the court experience
with school punishment developed in connection with criminal prosecution and
tort damage actions against schoolmasters for physical punishment of children.
The teacher, originally conceived of as exercising authority through parental
delegation,23 came to be thought of as a parental analogue, with "inherent"
powers arising out of the similarity of the teacher's role to the parent's.24 The
in loco parentis concept is used by courts today to state the prerogatives of the
institution, as well as the teacher; the university, as well as the primary school.
It involves expulsion, as well as physical punishment; reinstatement, as well
as damages. "College authorities stand in loco parentis [concerning pupils]
and ... may make any rule or regulation for the government, or betterment of
their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose.
'2
5
Shading off from the in loco parentis analogy, some decisions are phrased in
terms of inherent needs of the teacher's functional role, rather than inherent
similarities to parental roles.20 The teacher's special competence, or his pur-
poses, or his necessary concern as teacher with the pupil behavior regulated,
are used to define the teacher's power to discipline.27 The foundation of the
22. Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903) (recognizing rule) ; see also
cases collected at 43 A.L.R.2d at 472-73 (1955).
23. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453; 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES 170 (1826) ; Drake
v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941) (express delegation of authority by
letter to school).
24. See, e.g., State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837) ("analogous" authority) ; State
ex rel. Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150, 155-57 (1878). The Wisconsin court, in an assault
and battery action against a teacher, held that the teacher stands for the time being in loco
parentis to his pupils because of his position, and that "to enable him to discharge [tls]
duties effectually, he must necessarily have the power to enforce prompt obedience to his
lawful commands." Id. at 156.
According to the Restatement, the in loco parentis power of private schools is delegated,
and the school "as the delegate of the parent is not privileged to inflict a punishment which
the parent has forbidden or to punish a child for doing or refusing to do what the parent
has directed the child to do or not to do." 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 153(1) (1934). But cf.
Curry v. Lasell Seminary, 168 Mass. 7, 46 N.E. 110 (1897) (Parents wished 20 year-old
daughter to visit home Sundays notwithstanding school rules; held, if parents won't agree
to reasonable school rules, exclusion of student is proper). As to public schools and col-
leges, even though attendance is voluntary, the Restatement takes the position that the in
loco parentis power is analogous to the parental in having its foundation. in recognition by
the law, independent of parental instructions. Id. at § 153(2).
25. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924), an action against
a college president for tort damages resulting from expulsion, in which the court adopts
the Burton doctrine (supra note 24).
Although Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913) is often cited no
authority for the existence of in loco parentis authority in the college, the doctrine of the
case is limited by its facts. The students at Berea were found to be country-folk unused
even to small town living, and thus needing special guidance; moreover, the specific rule
in question, prohibiting eating at local restaurants, was held justified by the health hazard
thought to exist.
26. Woods v. Simpson, 126 Atl. 882, 146 Md. 547 (1924).
27. See, e.g., Landers v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
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special status is sometimes discovered by courts in a long standing custom of
schools. 28 And this custom may be thought to be institutionalized in the com-
mon statutory charter grants to colleges of power "to make and establish such
Ordinances, Orders and Laws as may tend to the good and wholesome
government of the said College & all the Students.20
An implied contract theory has also been used to define the teacher-student
relation,30 where the customary school authority has been said to be incorpor-
ated into the terms of the student's enrollment. Thus, even though the rela-
tionship of the parties be determined in fact by their participation in a pre-
established social pattern, most courts prefer to state their rights and duties
inter sese in contractual terms.31 When school catalogs or other specific docu-
ments exist, the courts generally take them to constitute express contractual
terms supplementing the implied contract and other sources of disciplinary
authority.32 College catalogs generally contain a Nwaiver clause reserving to the
University a discretionary right to expel-as one school puts it, "at any time,
for any reason deemed sufficient to it, and no reason for requiring such with-
drawal need be given." 33 The presence of such clauses enables the court to
28. Ibid.; John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924).
29. The charter of Dartmouth College, reprinted in Er.uorr, Crsmxrrns AiD BAsic
LAws OF SEL.ECTD AmmcAN UNIVERsrIES AND COLL.EGES 185 (1934) ; see also, e.g., Duhe
University, "to make such rules, regulations, and by-laws not inconsistent with the Con-
stitutions of the United States and of this State, as may be necessary for the good govern-
ment of said University." Id. at 191. Colby College, "to make and ordain, as occasion may
require, reasonable rules, orders and by-laws, not repugnant to the laws of this Common-
wealth, with reasonable penalties for the good government of said Institution." Id. at 126.
Princeton University, "to have the immediate care of the education and government of such
students." Id. at 427. Yale University, "the Government ... of the said College ... and
shall have Power... to make, ordain and establish all such wholesome and reasonable
Laws, Rules, and Ordinances, not Repugnant to the [public laws] as they shall think fit
and proper for... Ordering, Governing, Ruling, and Managing the said college... which
shall be laid before this [state] Assembly as often as Required, and may also be Repealed
or Disallowed by this [state] assembly wher they shall think proper. Id. at 591-92.
30. In return for the student's reliance in money and time, the school is said to have
promised to allow him to continue for the entire course of study, and to award him a degree,
conditional on the student's having conformed to reasonable rules reasonably enforced, to
the imposition of which the student is held to have impliedly "consented." Booker v. Grand
Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909) ; People ex rel. Cecil v. Belle-
vue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y. Supp. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
31. "Almost invariably the courts regard the situation as one of contract between the
student and university." Note, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 898, 899 (1935). But the same cases
employing contract terminology, will speak also in terms of status, whether in loco parcntis,
inherent authority of schools, or both. Many commentators regard the school-student rela-
tionship as essentially one of status, rather than contract, and regard an action for improper
expulsion as one for breach of the relationship itself, sounding in tort. See, e.g., ibid.;
Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAv. L. REv. 993, 1007
(1930); Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1164 (1962); cf. Cowan, Interference with Academic
Freedom: The Pre-Natal History of a Tort, 4 VAYNE L. REv. 205 (1958). Compare Sum-
mers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts do in Fact, 70 YALE LJ. 175 (1960).
32. De Haan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957).
33. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435, 438 (1923).
19631 1369
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
construe terms, rather than construct them, in order to express the relation it
deems to exist.3 4 In sum, school authority may be verbalized as arising from
the following sources: express delegation of the authority of the parental
status; delegation of the authority of the parental status implied from similar
roles; functional needs of schools; customary powers of schools; legislation or
charter; implied contract between student and school; express contract be-
tween student and school.
Sources of Limits on School Authority
The authority to expel, however, is not considered to be plenary, no matter
what its source. Doctrinal limitations upon the school's authority to expel are
found in a range of legal theories, including those which explain the sources
of school power. Although cases enforcing these limitations are relatively few,
their well-settled nature is reflected in their consistent prominence as dicta in
cases holding for defendant schools. The basic rule, that there is no right to
expel arbitrarily, was established by a nineteenth century holding of the New
York Court of Appeals. Where a medical student was excluded from final
exams after finishing his course, the court employed a theory of implied con-
tract for education:
When there is an absolute and arbitrary refusal there is no exercise of
discretion. It is nothing but a wilful violation of the duties which they
have assumed. Such a position could never receive the sanction of a court
in which even the semblance of justice was attempted to be administered"
In a Michigan Supreme Court case of the same generation, a similar implied
contract theory was used in reaching the conclusion that even students who had
not yet completed their course had a right to be protected from arbitrary ex-
pulsion. Moreover, the fact that reasons were stated would not exculpate the
university from a charge of arbitrariness, and the propriety of the grounds for
expulsion-in this case the students' race-could be evaluated by the Court. 0
When the implied contractual terms of the student-school relationship are
supplemented by specific documents, the contract analysis is no less a source of
limits to the school's authority. Courts have rejected interpretations of the con-
tract authorizing an absolute power to expel, in situations where catalog
waiver clauses reserved the right to expel only for specific reasons; they have
indicated instead that expulsion may then be only for the specified reasons.37 In
practice, however, if the purposes stated in the catalog clause are broad, the
34. The judge's freedom is as great in, the one case as in the other. See, e.g., Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
35. People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y. Supp.
490 (Sup. Ct. 1891). Cf. note 37 infra and text.
36. Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909)
(dictum).
37. See Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928);
Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, reversing 34 Misc. 2d 319,
231 N.Y.S.2d 403, aff'd mnem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
1370 [Vol. 72:1,162
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXPULSIONS
actual restriction imposed on the exercise of authority by this doctrine is
slight.
38
Where courts use status rather than contract relationship as a source of
authority, they also find, built in to the doctrine, limitations upon its exercise.
Although these limitations arose in the schoolmaster-pupil context, in con-
nection with doctrines of authority, they seem, unlike the doctrines of au-
thority,39 to have been articulated only in the schoolmaster-pupil context.
Where it is the court's conception that the schoolmaster derives his authority
in loco parentis from parental delegation or from analogy, the incompleteness
of that analogy or agency relationship has been drawn upon to restrict the
motives for punishment, the extent of punishment, the type of pupil behavior
regulable, and the mode of administration of punishment. The only motive
for punishment held proper is regard for the welfare of the child punished-or,
more broadly, for the welfare of the children of the school. 40 Painful punish-
ment is authorized by the law only when it is in the best interests of the child;
therefore any punishment causing lasting physical damage is forbidden.41 Even
a lesser quantum of punishment may be improper, depending on the child's
age, sex, or size4 2 The court must also consider whether the offense committed
justified the amount of punishment inflicted.4 3 Courts would require that the
38. See cases cited note 37 supra. De Haan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627
(D. Mass. 1957), where a catalog clause reserved to the school ". . . the right to sever the
connection of any student with the university for appropriate reason." "The problem of
what constitutes an appropriate reason," the court held, "must clearly be left to [the school]
authorities... ." Using such reasoning, the court denied. reinstatement to an expelled grad-
uate student who had protested, the inadequacy of his scholarship. For criticism of this case
see Comment, 10 STAN%. L. REv. 746 (1958).
39. Notes 22-25 supra.
40. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 367 (1837) ; State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18
N.E. 266 (1888). See also 1 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 151 (1934) or purpose of punishment.
Cases collected in Annot. 43 A.L.R2d at 471, 483 (1955).
41. Any "permanent injury," "permanent ill" or "lasting mischief' is considered im-
permissible "as not only being unnecessary for but inconsistent with, the purpose for which
correction is authorized." State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 366 (1837) ; Boyd v. State,
88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1890).
"The privilege to punish a child is given, for the benefit of the child and for the purpose
of securing his proper education and training. A punishment which does serious or perma-
nent harm to the child or which is of such character as to injure his self-respect is obviously
detrimental and not beneficial to his future." 1 RESTATEMENT, Torrs § 149, comment (a)
(1934).
42. Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605, 14 N.E. 68 (1887) ; Sheehan v.
Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 At. 841 (1885).
In determining whether a punishment is excessive, the nature of the offense, the
apparent motive of the offender, the influence of his example upon other children of
the same family or group, the sex, age, and physical and mental condition of the
child, are factors to be considered.
1 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 150 (1934).
See also cases collected in Annot. 43 A.L.R2d 471, 483 (1955).
43. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) ; 1 RESTATEmENT, ToRsTs § 150 (1934) ; see
also cases collected in Annot. 43 A.L.Ph2d 471, 479-82 (1955).
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scope of extra-classroom behavior regulated be limited to conduct germane to
the classroom. Some, indeed, insist that the relation be direct and inimediate.
44
And punishment of a child without his knowing why has been held to be im-
permissible.45 Finally, courts exercise a general supervisory power over in loco
parentis authority by imposing the additional standard of "reasonableness" on
all rules and punishments.
46
Limitations may be more readily recognized by courts where, as in the case
of the professional or graduate student, the likely harm of expulsion is rela-
tively specific. Thus, a distinction possibly present, but not articulated in the
case-law, is that between graduate and undergraduate students. Graduate stu-
dents are involved in a disproportionate number of cases, and seemingly re-
ceive favorable treatment in a greater proportion of claims. An unusual pro-
portion of the early college discipline cases involve professional school stu-
dents ;47 the earliest school segregation cases to be decided favorably to stu-
dents' constitutional rights involved graduate and professional students. 48 There
are several possible explanations: graduate students may be more conscious of
their rights and better able to litigate to defend them. Or, graduate students
may face a greater and more certain deprivation in being excluded and, there-
fore, be more highly motivated in the assertion of their rights. Through these
considerations, the courts may have been led to provide more intensive review.
That a student's constitutional rights are any limitation on his private col-
lege has not been established by any modern holding.49 But the Flag Salute
Cases, striking down state school requirements infringing freedom of belief,
include students at state schools, at least, among those protected by the First
44. State ex rel. Dresser v. District Bd., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232 (1908) ; Lander
v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) ; O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 128 At. 25 (1925);
Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485 (1885). Cf. the Restatement rule that the privilege of using
reasonable force exists "only insofar as the privilege is necessary for the education"' of the
child. 1 RFSTATEMENT, ToRTs § 152 (1934).
45. State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145 (1878).
46. "A . . . teacher ... is not liable, either civilly or criminally, for moderately cor-
recting a ... pupil ... but it is otherwise if the correction is immoderate and unreasonable
.... [citing several treatises] In fact, this rule seems to be universally recognized by the
courts of this country." Clasen, v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 283, 95 N.W. 640, 642 (1903). See
also cases collected at 79 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts §§ 494(d), 501, 503(b) ,
47 Am. JUR., Schools, §§ 175, 181; Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d 471, 472-73 (1955).
47. See People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.
Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1891) (medical student) ; Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 Ati.
14 (1904) ; Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1902) (law
students).
48. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Univ. of Mo.), Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (Univ. of Okla.); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950) (Univ. of Tex.) ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(Univ. of Okla.). The first three cases involve admission to law schools, the fourth, the
racially discriminatory rules of a graduate school.
49. But it has been suggested that the provisions common to statutes, Charter, and the
case law, that no school rule may be "inconsistent with law" be "construed to assure the
preservation of fundamental liberties." Note, 35 COLUm. L. REv. 898, 901 n.19 (1935). See
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Amendment . 0 Also, even before the School Segregation Cases established the
rights of students to racial non-discrimination, 5 1 the Supreme Court had held
that a state university's disciplinary authority over students already admitted
was limited by the constitutional standard of equal protection.5 2 And, in Dixon
v. Alabama State Board of Education, involving expulsion of Negro students
by state colleges for participation in sit-ins, the Fifth Circuit held that state
colleges, like all other governmental bodies, were constitutionally required to
observe due process when inflicting deprivations.5 3 These holdings establish
the principle that the disciplinary authority of state colleges is not solely a
matter of the discretion of officials but is limited by the constitutional rights
of the students.
4
Several courts have recognized that there are procedural, as well as substan-
tive, limitations on the school's power to sever the student-school relationship.
At one extreme is the "no hearing" doctrine :5 that a school need not inform
the student of the evidence against him 56 or allow him an opportunity to
present a defense 5 7 --indeed, that a school need not specify on what charges
the student is being expelled.5 8 Other cases suggest an "informal hearing"
N.Y. EDucATIo LAW § 68(10) (1909) ; see generally BaRT tr, op. cit. .stpra note 16;
cf. Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y. Supp. 799 (1926) ; Anthony
v. Syracuse Univ., 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y. Supp. 796, rev'd, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 435 (1928). There also seems to be implicit authority for the exercise of judicial
review.
50. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), ov'erruling Miners-
ville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Cf. Hamiltorn v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245
(1934) (recognized federal court jurisdiction over claims that state college rules were con-
stitutionally invalid, but sustained compulsory ROTC at state colleges against the claim
for exemption of conscientious objectors, as a form of draft).
51. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
53. 294 F.2d, 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) ; accord, Knight v. State
Bd, of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
54. But see Steier v. New York Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 966 (1960). Supra note 6.
55. Expulsion without any hearing was sustained in several cases; John B. Stetson
Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ; De Haan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp.
626 (D. Mass. 1957) ; Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435
(1928) ; Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Ati. 220 (1923). Barker v. Bryn
Mawr College has dicta implying that state colleges are subject to a higher standard than
private schools. Accord, John B. Stetson Univ., 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640
(1924); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 SAV. 204 (1913); Dixon .. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d, 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
56. People ex reL Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635
(1956); Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (Cuyahoga Co.), 11 Ohio
C.C. Dec. 515 (1901).
57. See State ex rel. Crain, v. Hamilton, 42 Mo. App. 24 (1890); State ex rel. Ingersoll
v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591, error disnissed, 278 U.S.
661 (1928) (student didn't deny charge) ; Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., note 56 supra;
Miller v. Clement, 205 Pa. 484, 55 At. 32 (1903).
58. See cases cited at note 55 mipra.
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rule: that a school may use whatever procedure a fair man might choose in
conducting its inquiry and in giving the student an opportunity to provide in-
formation.5 9 More formal procedures, denominated "quasi-judicial," are im-
posed by some courts which draw upon notions of due process, natural justice,
or fundamental fairness. 60 Often excluded from the requirements courts im-
pose on such hearings are those elements of the court trial thought to be in-
appropriate for use at a school, such as the niceties of evidentiary rules, 01 the
imposition of an oath, 2 and, sometimes, oral cross-examination. 3 The strict-
est procedural standard suggested for expulsion hearings is the "judicial"
model, requiring procedural safeguards similar to those of a criminal trial.0 4
Recent cases in the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and in the judicial
Committee of the Privy Council suggest that the quasi-judicial standard is re-
quired of American public colleges and the universities of the Common-
wealth. 65 While some of the older cases suggest, on common law principles,
a judicial or quasi-judicial standard for American private colleges,00 more re-
59. See Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., supra note 56 (faculty must act "as
jurors") ; cf. Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1902);
Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 101, 110 N.W. 736 (1907) (public school);
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 216-17, 263 Pac. 433, 437-38, cert, dencied,
277 U.S. 591, error dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928).
One justification for a rule that "due examination" does not require a "formal trial,"
was stated by a court faced with a public school expulsion. It reasoned that "from the
necessity of the case such examinations must be wholly informal. Directors of school dis-
tricts must frequently come from the plain and unlearned farmers and citizens of the coun'.
try, unused to matters of judicial inquiry." State ex rel. Crain v. Hamilton, 42 Mo. App.
24, 31 (1890). But universities, of course, have available to conduct hearings the members
of their faculty, as well as the students; universities with law schools may make special use
of law students or law professors for the conduct of disciplinary inquiries.
60. Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 Atl. 14 (1904); Comm. ex rel. Hill v.
McCauley, 2 Pa. County Ct. 459 (1886) ; 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887) ; State ex rel. Sher-
man v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942) (doctrine
recognizing rule as accepted by "all the authorities." 180 Tenm at 111, 171 S.W.2d at 827.) ;
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961) ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) ; University
of Ceylon v. Fernandez, [1960] 1 Weekly L.R. 223 (Privy Council, applying common
law principles), reversing 58 N.L.R. 265 (Ceylon 1956).
61. Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904).
62. Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. 144, 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 515
(1901).
63. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
64. Comm. ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 2 Pa. County Ct. 459 (1886), 3 Pa. County Ct.
77 (1887) ; Geiger v. Milford Ind. School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (1944).
65. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961). Accord, Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961). University of Ceylon v. Fernandez, [1960] 1 Weekly L.R. 223 (Privy Council, on
common law principles), reversing 58 N.L.R. 265 (Ceylon 1956).
66. Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 Atl. 14 (1904) ; cf. cases cited in notes
60 and 64 sitpra.
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cent cases approve informal hearings or, where the college catalog has reserved
that power, expulsions with no hearing or charges.07
All of these limitations might be generalized into a requirement imposed by
courts as a minimum standard on school disciplinary authority no matter
what its source-a requirement of "reasonableness." 08 While a few courts may
still indulge in a presumption that schools have acted reasonably,(9 the present
majority view seems to be that reasonableness is a question of fact." The rea-
sonableness rule which extends to both substance and procedure might be
stated as follows: that expulsion must proceed from reasonable rules reason-
ably applied.
The courts, however, resting on the easy use of legal analogies, have failed to
supply meaningful content for this verbalization of the reasonableness rule.'
67. People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill App. 2d 207, 134 N.E 635 (1957);
De Haan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957).
68. To those who have charge of the culture of our youth, is conceded the power of
making needful rules and regulations for their government and control, and these
may be enforced, if done in. a due manner without external interference, even though
at times hardships may seemingly be done and innocency suffer, but the reasonable-
ness of such rules and regulations, as well as the regularity of the proceedings under
them, have been decided, not infrequently, to be a proper subject for judicial inquiry.
Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 2 Pa. County Ct. 459, 463 (1887). State ex rel.
Stallard v. White, 82 Iad. 278, 286 (1882) ; see also Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591, 127
Pac. 417 (1912); Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 377, 245 N.AV. 125, 127 (1932).
The rule "that dismissals must not be arbitrary, in bad faith, or in the abuse of discretion"
has been called usual. Note, 35 CoLum. L. Ray. 898, 899 (1935). See also cases cited at
note 60 supra.
Even where a statute grants in loco parentis authority over pupil behavior, it will be
construed to authorize no more than reasonable punishment. Rupp v. Zintner, 29 Pa. D. &
C. 625 (1937).
69. Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354 (1930) (recognizing rule); see also cases
collected in Annot. 43 A.L.R2d 477 (1955). Cf. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div.
487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928). It has been held that the presumptiorr exists merely in the
absence of testimony; that there was a burden on the pupil of going forward with evidence,
but not a burden of proof. Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo. App. 354, 94 Mo. App. 74, 67 S.W.
965 (1901).
70. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) ; Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640
(1903) (recognizing rule); see cases collected in, Annot. 43 A.L.R2d at 476-77.
71. In several cases, college discipline which impaired the exercise by students of free-
dom of religion or free speech was sustained by courts as "reasonable," or even lauded,
without consideration of the principle espoused by most educators, that no impairment of
freedom of expression can be reasonable within the liberal arts university. See writers cited
note 166 infra. Private college cases during World War I demonstrated judicial approval
of college punishment of students for unpopular political sentiments. The making of off-
campus, anti-war speeches was held to be a valid ground of expulsion in Samson v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y. Supp. 202 (1917) and the alleged socialistic
opinions of a senior law student were held to justify his expulsion in People cx rel. Golden-
koff v. Albany Law School, 198 App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y. Supp. 349 (1921).
And in the post World War II atmosphere, Michigan State University expelled a vet-
eran who had been placed on, "strict" probation for distributing F.E.P.C. leaflets on campus
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In an old New York state case, for example, a student was expelled from New
York Law School for denying that he had passed an innocuous, but unappreci-
ated note to a female fellow student. Drawing on basic principle of contract
law, the trial court ridiculed the notion that the school, one party to the con-
tract for education, could constitute itself a tribunal to decide when the student
had breached the contract and forfeited his right to education. The question of
breach was for decision by courts. Reversing, the appeals court held that status
rather than contract law governed, and that the school's inherent power to
decide questions of student conduct and expulsion had been properly exercised
and compelled denial of reinstatement. 72 A generation later, when Syracuse
University expelled a girl without charges, for the reason that she was not "a
typical Syracuse girl," the New York trial court applied status theory and
concluded that the school had violated certain minimum rights inherent in the
student status. On this occasion the appeals court resorted to contract law in
reversing, holding that expulsion without charges or hearing was authorized
because the school catalog reserved such power.73 Where private-law concepts
were employed by a Federal District Court to uphold expulsions of Negro sit-
in demonstrators from Alabama State College, the Fifth Circuit reversed,
using a public law due process concept as a model to dictate the disciplinary
after being denied a club charter for such activities. He allegedly organized an off-campus
meeting at which the main speaker was a Communist, and was then expelled for violation
of his probation. The University impliedly claimed that state colleges may prohibit students
from organizing off-campus political activities. The Michigan, Supreme Court's denial (un-
reported) of petitions for mandamus and for rehearing, and the U.S. Supreme Courts denial
of certiorari, without opinions, did little to clarify the "reasonableness" of this claim of the
state college for exemption from normal constitutional standards. Zarichny v. State Board
of Agriculture, mandamus denied, Jan. 13, 1949, rehearing denied, Feb. 28, 1949, Michigan
Supreme Court (unreported) ; cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949). For facts of the Case see
17 U.S.L. W EK 3374; Petition for Certiorari, pp. 1-5; Brief in Support of Petition for
Certiorari, pp. 8-11; Brief in Reply to Petition for Certiorari, pp. 6-10. See also Steler v,
New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 US. 966
(1960) (sustaining expulsion of student for campaign of criticism against school authorl-
ties) ; Lessin v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., Superior Ct., Riverside Co. (unreported,
see note 15 supra) (refusing to interfere with school rule barring Communist speakers
from campus) ; Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104
So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1958) (sustaining exclusion of student from teacher-training program be-
cause of his atheism); Egan v. Moore, 36 Misc. 2d 967, 235 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1962) (enjoin-
ing state university from allowing Communist speakers on campus).
Some schools and courts do appear to be solicitous of student political rights. Thus,
officers of an Indiana University socialist club were indicted for attending a club meeting
at which, allegedly, the forcible overthrow of the government had been advocated. The
University refused to suspend or expel the students. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1963, p. 11, col. 1.
And see Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (sit-in demon-
strators reinstated) ; Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., Docket No. 27996, 2d Cir., June 4,
1963. (semnble).
72. Goldstein v. New York Univ., 38 Misc. 93, 77 N.Y. Supp. 80, rev'd, 76 App. Div.
80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1902).
73. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y. Supp. 796, rev'd, 224 App.
Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).
[Vol. 72 :13621376
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXPULSIONS
procedures required at least of state colleges. 74 Conversely, in the St. John's
University expulsion case, where students were expelled for participation in a
civil marriage ceremony, the trial court drew upon the public law notion of fair
warning to determine the appropriate standard of notice of rules required;
reversing, the higher state court also required notice, but used the private law
concept of expectation to give content to that standard, holding that the stu-
dents might be expelled even though no specific rule prohibited their actions,
since they were held to have had actual expectation that the school would dis-
approve their acts.75
Doctrinal Alternatives
These four pairs of reversals illustrate the manner in which courts talk as if
the analogies upon which they draw compel the conclusion whether to sustain
or invalidate expulsions. Were courts to think through these analogies, or to
create new ones on the model of ordinary citizens' rights, they would find a
more effective means of exercising review than they now seem to think pos-
sible.
A. Contract Alternatives
Using the express contract analysis for student cases--characterizing broad
reservation of power to discipline and waiver clauses as terms of a school-stu-
dent contract--courts have traditionally refused to interfere with discharges.70
And this reluctance does not seem to spring from the fact that reinstatement
rather than damages for breach is sought as remedy. 77 Rather, once the court
has seized upon the contract analogy, it acts as if it were driven to finding for
the college. Yet these student "contracts" are created under circumstances
74. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), rcvd,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See note 5 supra.
75. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S2d 403, rc,'d, 17 App. Div.
2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd icin., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); see note 7
supra.
76. A typical catalog clause on university discipline is that of St. John's University
under which students were held to have been validly expelled for participating in a civil
marriage ceremony:
In conformity with the ideals of Christian education and conduct, the University
reserves the right to dismiss a student at any time on whatever grounds the Univer-
sity judges advisable. Each student by his admission to the University recognizes
this right. The continuance of any student on the roster of the University, the receipt
of academic credit, graduation, the granting of a degree of certificate, rests solely
within the powers of the University.
Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S2d 410, aff'd mern., 12 N.Y2d
802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962), discussed supra note 7. See text at notes 14 and 37-38 supra.
77. On principle, it would seem that a court should be willing to grant the compen-
satory remedy of reinstatement whenever an expulsion is unreasonable, even though it might
require malice, or lack of bona fides as an additional element of the action before granting
judgment for cash damages, especially if termed punitive.
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where the bargaining positions of the parties are extremely disparate. Modern
courts, resting on similar disparities, have taken a far more restrictive attitude
toward the binding force of such "contracts" in other areas.
The university's reservation of power to discipline and the student's waiver
give the university power to terminate the school-student relationship despite
partial performance by the student.78 This power may be characterized as
power to perform or not at its own will, as power to determine finally whether
breach occurred, or as an ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts to review
claims arising out of expulsions. The clauses are standarized terms of a com-
plex printed document. They are proposed in a manner which brooks no
negotiation and by a party which, by virtue of its experience and its strong
seller's position, is clearly able to impose conditions. The student is in an
unusually weak bargaining position. Most often he is of an age such that only
limited competency to contract is imputed to him; his promises are ordinarily
unenforceable against him.70 Indeed, it has been suggested that a minor's con-
tract for education is enforceable against him only when, as a whole, the agree-
ment is clearly beneficial to the student.80
Characterization of the clauses as conferring power on the college to per-
form or not at its own will would lead to the conclusion that no express con-
tract exists. Reservation of so broad-reaching a power arguably renders the
promise illusory and the contract nugatory.8 ' Yet the parties would, by virtue
of their on-going relationship, have rights inter sese. Before the expulsion, the
student had reasonably and substantially relied to his detriment through the
expenditure of time, effort, and funds in the induced expectation that by meet-
ing reasonable standards he would receive a degree.82 The court might there-
fore fashion its remedy on a theory of constructive contract for education. The
terms of this contract could be found in those catalog conditions and "customs
of the trade" which meet the test of reasonableness.
8 3
Alternatively, characterization of the clauses as bestowing upon the univer-
sity power finally to determine the occurrence of breach might, in the context of
78. Once the student enters into performance-by reliance through abandonment of
other offers of admission, by beginning his studies, or by making his first tuition payment
-the contract entered into is an indivisible one for the full period leading to a degree. See
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909). Cf. WILMS-
TON, CONTRACrS § 49 (3d ed. 1957).
79. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 6 (1950).
80. A fiduciary theory has been suggested as doctrinal source of the duties of advance
warning and utmost fairness said to be owed, by the school of the student. Seavey, Dismissal
of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. Rnv. 1406, 1407, 1409 (1957). See Ioblitz v.
Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (Cuyahoga Co.), 11 Ohio C.C. Dec. 515 (1901)
(dictum) (concept of waste of trust's facilities if student is wrongfully dismissed before
graduation).
81. Note, 77 U. PA. L. R.v. 694, 695 n,.7 (1929).
82. See note 78 supra.
83. For use of custom as a source to find the terms of the customary relationship-
assent to which is said to be manifested primarily by conduct-see, e.g., John, B. Stetson
Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1860).
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the other strong indications of imbalance of bargaining position, lead to treat-
ment of the agreement as adhesionary.84 At the least, strict construction
against the university, and insistence upon proof of actual notice to the student
of inequitable terms, would seem to be dictated by the doctrines of contracts
of adhesion;85 further protection against "unconscionable" or "unreasonable"
terms might be achieved through a refusal to enforce, on public policy
grounds. Broadly stated terms might be restricted in their scope to the pro-
cedures and scope of activities which the student would reasonably have as-
sumed the institution to have meant.86
Finally, the clauses, if characterized as attempts to prevent judicial review
of expulsion claims growing out of the contract, might be severed from the
rest of the contract and struck down on the public policy grounds invoked in
similar contract situations.8 7 Such treatment could be afforded whether or not
the contract as a whole is characterized as adhesionary, as it has been where
union constitutions contain similar clauses.88
Thus, following out the contract analogy which it has chosen, a court in
expulsion cases could apply the contract law of party imbalance, providing
substantially greater freedom to give effect to its notions of reasonableness.
And where only implied contract theories are utilized, the judge is free, as
suggested by relevant case law, to read such terms into the contract as justice
to both student and university seems to demand.80 The freedom of courts to
use contract as a device to broaden, rather than narrow, court review is well
demonstrated by a frequent judicial review of internal union discipline through
a contract theory of union con'stitutions.00
B. In Loco Parentis Alternatives
In college situations, courts have seemed to borrow in loco parentis' doc-
trines as sources of power without importing the limitations upon that power.
But extension to collegiate situations of the limitations usually imposed upon
84. Cf. 3 CoaRiN, CONTRACTS § 559 (1960); RESTATE--ENT, CONTRACTS § 236(d);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum.
L. R-v. 629 (1943) ; see also 6A CoBiN, CONTRACTS § 1375 n.9; § 1376 (1962).
85. Cf. note 80 supra.
86. Ibid.
87. Cf. 6A Comaai, CoNrRAcrs § 1527 (1962); see generally, Comment, Linitations
on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE L.J. 723, esp. 755-69 (1962).
88. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
YA.E L.J. 175 (1960).
89. See 1 WnusroN, CoNtaCTS § 3 (1936) ; 5 id. at § 1293 (1937).
90. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALEi
L.J. 175 (1960).
The doctrinal structure, despite the superficial rigidity of the contract theory, is loose-
jointed and flexible in the hands of the courts. The nature of discipline provisions,
as well as the sensitive and vital interests involved, increase this flexibility and the
courts have used it freely to impose judicial regulation on union discipline. Within
wide limits, it is not the union constitution but the court which controls.
Id. at 186.
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in loco parentis at the grammar school level could restrict the imposition of
expulsion as punishment. Where expulsion would permanently degrade the
student or close professional doors, or is inflicted without specific charges, It
seems highly analogous to schoolmaster punishment which is unexplained 01
or works permanent physical harm.9 2 Consequently, the importation of limits
on schoolmaster authority into the collegiate situation seems fully appropriate.
If the court views in loco parentis in its original terms, as an express or im-
plied parental delegation rather than an assumption of similar authority based
on similar functional needs, other limitations on college authority to expel may
be suggested. Students over twenty-one would not be subject to the college
paternalism, parental statements of permissible activity (or norms of parental
control for children of that age) would be adopted. Expulsion would be severe-
ly restricted as an available remedy, since it involves severance of the parental
relationship-an action unanticipated save in the most extreme circumstances.
Where the court views the parent-school analogy in functional terms, a limi-
tation of authority to the scope of the functional similarities flows from the
doctrine. For the modern, nearly-mature college student and the modern, im-
personal university, the grounds for similarity to the family context seem few.
The university is not able to act in the personal manner of a parent ;93 the
student hardly needs the guidance given a child. Expulsion remains a punish-
ment foreign to the parental role.
The parental analogy suggests that only the manner in which a parent might
choose to discipline is proper for the university's action. But does the institu-
tion engage in a personal exercise of authority attended by substantial and
careful inquiry into underlying facts? In loco parentis reasoning is strained by
the fact that expulsion is contemplated. Where in loco parentis is still used to
defend university action, it may be little more than a conclusory category
grounded upon assumptions of inherent power-the authority of the school
qua school. And the institutional analysis suggested by this approach seems to
entail limitation of authority to that required for the genuine needs of the
school by its institutional responsibilities to its students. Since it would de-
pend, not upon necessarily imperfect analogy, but upon analysis of the em-
91. See note 45 supra.
92. See note 41 supra.
93. A fortiori the university cannot act as a parent would, for even a schoolmaster
cannot.
From the intimacy and nature of the relation, and the necessary character of family
government, the law suffers no intrusion upon the authority of the parent, and the
privacy of domestic life, unless in extreme cases of cruelty and injustice. This par-
ental power is little liable to abuse, for it is continually restrained by natural affec-
tion, the tenderness which the parent feels for his offspring, an affection ever on the
alert, and acting rather by instinct thar reasoning.
The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence he may not safely be
trusted with all a parent's authority, for he does not act from the instinct of parental
affection. He should be guided and restrained by judgment and wise discretion, and
hence is responsible for their reasonable exercise.
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122-23 (1859).
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pirical factors involved in the situation presented to the court, this mode of
approach to the problems of student-university relations would seem potential-
ly the most fruitful. What these institutional needs of schools are, however, has
rarely if ever been investigated by the courts. Extensive discussion of them and
of the limits which they entail will be postponed to Part II of this Comment.
C. Constitutioiwl Alternatives
Fuller development of one further source of limitations within the confines
of present doctrine does seem possible-the application of constitutional doc-
trine or constitutionally derived doctrine to the school expulsion situation. Ap-
plication of the Constitution to state schools has already been noted. As an arm
of state government, the state university is subject to all the restrictions, sub-
stantive and procedural, which circumscribe governmental action generally."
Expulsion for failure to attend compulsory chapel 05 or for engaging in non-
violent assertion of political rights would be improper, as would be expulsion
without procedural due process.06
What is less dear is the application of constitutional safeguards, substantive
and procedural, to "private" schools. The involvement of these schools in
quasi-governmental activity, the public importance of their function, and their
frequently close association with state and federal government, raise the pos-
sibility of an extension of constitutional doctrines by "paraconstitutional"
techniques such as have been used in other areas of the law to proliferate the
purpose of constitutional doctrines.97 These "paraconstitutional" techniques
use the judicial armory of alternative doctrines and broad common law no-
tions-such as "reasonable"--to give effect to constitutional policy. For ex-
ample, while in the state college case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education 98 the court used "due process" language, it was the characteristics
94. See cases cited notes 49-54 supra.
95. It may be that even, the private, secular, school has no power to compel church at-
tendance on a student against his religious beliefs. See Miami Military Institute v. Leff,
129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (1926); contra, People v. Wheaton College. Compare
North v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 137 IlL 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891).
96. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (.D. ALa. 1960),
rezvd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) ; Knight v. State Bd. of
Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
If access to the bar may not be refused by a character and fitness committee without
affording confrontation and cross-examination, it might seem that the state professional
school, whose order of expulsion is the equivalent of such a denial of access, should afford
the same protection. Willner v. Committee, 31 U.S.L. NVxx 4439 (May 13, 1963).
97. For example, in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the wire ser-
vice monopoly case, the Supreme Court held that "the First Amendment, far from provid-
ing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons
to the contrary." Id. at 20, per Black, J. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, took the bylaws
of the Associated Press as violating the Sherman Act's rule of reason, because they "of-
fended" the interest in, free expression protected by the First Amendment. "A public in-
terest so essential to the vitality of our democratic government may be defeated by private
restraints no less than by public censorship." Id. at 38.
98. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 930 (1961).
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of colleges in general, not of state colleges alone, that dictated the content of
the standard. Were a private college case on all fours with Dixon now to arise,
"paraconstitutional" technique could easily be employed for effectuating the
"constitutional" policy of fairness, by applying the same requirement under
the rubric of "reasonableness."
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.9 suggests one basis on which applica-
tion of constitutional policies to the private university situation could be built.
A Negro non-member of a union, alleging that the union had discriminated
against Negroes in bargaining, sued for relief from the union-employer con-
tract which purported to govern the terms of his employment. Observing that
the union, as a bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act, acted "by
authority of the statute"-100 and was "clothed with powers not unlike that of a
legislature,"''1 the Supreme Court concluded that Congress "did not intend
to confer plenary power . . . without imposing on [the union] any duty to
protect".102 those who otherwise would have "no means of protecting their
interests."' 0 3 The statutory duty imposed was held to be "at least as exacting
duty ... as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature." Chief Justice Stone
observed that were such a statutory duty not implied, "constitutional questions
arise."' 05 The power of private universities to "govern" students or make
"laws" for them is similarly granted by statute, i.e., the special chartering
acts, 06 which still retain significance despite the possible decline in significance
of corporate charters. 07 Students have no more given their consent to the
exercise of authority against them than have workers. Workers pick their in-
dustry, and students their school. Workers are subject to the bargaining agent
who exists in their industry, students to the authorities who exist in their
colleges. Universities, like unions, are not realistically described as private, but
as quasi-public institutions. And the educational process is as important a
social experience as is the work relationship. The disciplinary power of college
officials seems to partake more of the characteristics of legislative power than
does the power to bargain. Thus, university discipline might readily be
brought under the doctrine of Steele, and be subject to duties of fairness at
least as exacting as constitutional duties.
But the constitutional restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment have tradi-
tionally been found applicable only where "state action"'08 is found to be
99. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Cf. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) ; James
v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).
100. 323 U.S. at 194.
101. Id. at 198.
102. Id. at 199.
103. Id. at 201.
104. Id. at 202.
105. Id. at 198.
106. See note 29 mipra.
107. But see Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Prote¢tion of
Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952).
108. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law... ." U.S. CoNsT.,, Amend. XIV, § 1.
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present. The test has been the extent of significant state participation in the
enterprise-through financial assistance or through regulation and control-or
the extent to which the enterprise acts under the color of state authority.2"
The association of "private" colleges with the state seems such that they
readily could be included within the amendment's due process and equal pro-
tection requirements. State participation in "private" schools, notably through
financial subsidy for the schools.n ° Such exemptions have been justified, in fact,
by judicial holding that private colleges fulfill a public purpose."u Moreover,
a significant part of the cash income of private colleges flows from governmental
sources including direct grants." 2 Besides giving financial aid, governments
exercise a degree of direct supervision and control over the affairs of "private"
colleges." 3 In some cases they are chartered by a special act of the legislature,
which includes a specific delegation of legislative power." 4 "Private" colleges
may be subject to state supervision through authority reserved in their state
charters." 5 Several states have agencies to supervise the administration of
"private" colleges." 6 Formal state supervision of some private colleges is at
109. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("state participation through any arrange-
ment, management, funds or property"); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (even though actual operation in private hands) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1947) (enforcement through courts of impermissible arrangement); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (action under color of state authority); Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (private detection); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
110. A number of colleges are tax-exempt, not by statute, but by irrepealable charter
provision. For a list of such colleges, see BLACKWELL, Corau.E LAW 157 (1961). Every
state, however, grants such an exemption, whether by constitutional provision, statute, or
judicial interpretation. See id. at 279-304, for the statutory provisions of each state. See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170; 26 C.F.R. § 1.170, 2(b) (3) (1961).
111. Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 At. 87 (1899); New
Haven v. Sheffield Scientific School, 59 Conn. 163, 22 Ad. 156 (1890). Compare Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
112. According to the Financial Report of Columbia University, for example, approd-
mately 38% of the university's 1961 income came from the federal government contract
program. See also the loan, fellowship, and college financial assistance program of the
National Defense Education Act, 72 Stat. 1581, 20 U.S.C. § 401 et scq. (1958).
113. See, e.g., THE BooK OF THE STATES 1960-1961, p. 300; N.Y. EDUC. IAw § 601;
National Defense Education Act, 72 Stat. 1580, 20 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
Federal funds may total a fourth or more of the income of a university. Some govern-
ment aid schemes are annual grants to all colleges in the state proportional to the number
of students. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 601-a (termed a Scholar Incentive Program and said to be
a grant "to" the student sent "in care of' his school).
114. Note 29 supra.
115. Of thirty-nine institutions surveyed in BRTLIrr, STATE Co NTROL OF PRIVATE
HIGHER EDUCATION 91 (1926) thirty were chartered by special act, and nine under general
law; one-third of the charters reserved to the state the right to amend or repeal.
116. Id. at 51-59. See also RESEARCH Divsiow, NATONAL EDUCATioN AssocmAio.n,
STATE AUTHORITY WiTH RESPECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUPRVISION OF NONPUBLIC
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES (2d rev. ed. Aug. 1951).
The Act of 1787 gave the Regents of the University of New York power to "visit and
inspect all the colleges, academies or schools which are or may be established in the state."
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times so extensive that the state legislature has reserved the power to revise
student regulations, and has established seats on the college governing board
to be filled by state officials.117 In addition to their identification with the state
through financial aid and regulation, all colleges act under color of state au-
thority. Colleges are among the few institutions in our society whose function
is the award of new statuses-degrees. 18 The authority to award such statuses
is not that of the school itself, but that of the state, which has specially author-
ized certain schools to grant certain degrees."10 Indeed, a number of "private"
colleges-including Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and Tulane-are explicitly "con-
stitutional" bodies, in the sense that their creation is confirmed by name in a
provision of the state constitution. 20 As a result of all these forms of state par-
ticipation and assistance, few if any "private" colleges are exempt under the
"state action" test.
On such an analysis of state assistance, a privately organized and managed
library school has been held subject to constitutional prohibitions of dis-
crimination, in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library.121 And Judge Skelly
Wright, in an order for summary judgment, later vacated, held that Tulane
University, though a "private school", had a degree of connection with the
state such that the school was subject to constitutional requirements.122 He
questioned
BARTLET, op. cit. sppra note 115, at 90. Columbia University, whose charter dates to colonial
times, is exempt from this power of "visitation." For the powers of the Regents see N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 206-08, 215, 219. A sample report form is at BARTLmTr, 64-67. The "visitor" of
a university is an office known to the common, law-usually the sovereign, the founder, or
its representative, and has powers of general supervision over the policies and affairs of
the institution. Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 11 Ohio C. Dec.
515 (1901).
117. See the Charter of Yale University, excerpted supra note 29.
118. Among the few other comparable legal status still recognized today are those of
citizen, felon, elector and spouse. Though the status of degree recipient is or can be awarded
by a "private" school-"with all the rights privileges, and immunities thereunto appertain-
ing'-the status is recognized by the state for such purposes as qualifications for profes-
sional licensiig and civil service requirements.
119. In 26 states the laws grant general power to confer degrees.
In 2 states power to confer degrees rests solely with the legislature.
In 10 states the educational agency approves the articles of incorporation or gives
license to confer degrees....
In 1 state the articles of incorporation, specify the degrees.
In 7 states no mention of degrees is made.
BARTLm, op. cit. supra note 115, at 49.
By statute in 1935 New York prohibited the granting of professional degrees "unless the
right to do so shall have been granted by the regents in writing .... ." N.Y. EDc. LAW
§ 224.
120. Massachusetts Constitution, ch. V, § 1; Connecticut Constitution, art. VIII, § 1;
California Constitution, art. IX, § 10; Louisiana Constitution, art. XII, § 24.
121. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
122. 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacation of decision approved on appeal of new
decree, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
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whether any school or college can ever be so "private" as to escape the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment .... Institutions of learning are
not things of purely private concern. The Supreme Court of the United
States has noted that "[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education." Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,... 347 U.S.
493.... No one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected with
the greatest public interest. And this is true whether it is offered by a
public or private institution .... Clearly the administrators of a private
college are performing a public function. They do the work of the state,
often in the place of the state. Does it not follow that they stand in the
state's shoes? And, if so, are they not then agents of the state, subject to
the constitutional restraints on governmental action, to the same extent as
private persons who govern a company town, Marsh v. State of Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 .... or control a political party, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461,... or run a city street car and bus service, Public Utilities Comm.
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 ... ; Boman v. Birmingham Transit Company, 5
Cir. 280 F.2d 531 or operate a train terminal, Baldwin v. Morgan, 5 Cir.,
287 F.2d 750 ?123
And where state law or official policy is found to require school disciplinary
measures which are racially discriminatory or otherwise infringe on constitu-
tional rights, such school disciplinary measures will not pass scrutiny of the
courts, under the doctrine of the Sit-in CasCs, 2 4 even if taken by private
schools supposedly without reference to the state mandate. On a doctrinal
basis, all these developments follow clearly from the authorities, thus providing
courts with a foundation for imposing first amendment, due process, or equal
protection standards on a nominally "private" school.
Some commentators, however, find the "state action" test potentially too
broad; they have suggested that only enterprises which perform "govern-
mental functions" or, under a more rigorous standard, only enterprises which
share de facto the power of governing be included with the constitutional re-
quirement.1 5 But under either of these limited interpretations, the doctrinal
possibility of holding private schools subject to constitutional standards remains
open. Education has been held to be a most important governmental func-
tion.126 And school discipline is governing within a reading of the doctrine
123. 203 F. Supp. at 858-59.
124. See Petersen v. City of Greenville, 31 U.S.L. NVFEY, 4475 (May 20, 1963) (ordi-
nance) ; Lombard v. Louisiana, 31 U.S.L. NVanK 4476 (Mlay 20, 1963) (official policy).
125. See, e.g., Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Govcensncntal
Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
126. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). It has also been suggested
that the category "governmental function" properly includes activities of a kind which are
regular and substantial facets of governmental operation. The reasoning is that, were the
"private" enterprises to shut down, the government would have to take their place. Thus,
it is concluded, the "private" enterprises are performing a function in the place of the gov-
ernment. Under such an analysis, education and justice-the two chief activities of state
and local governments-would be the "governmental functions" par excellence, and justice
on campus, a fortiori, would be a "governmental function" and therefore subject to con-
stitutional requirements.
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established by the White Primary Cases:127 whoever is allowed by the state
to participate in the processes of governing is subject to the same limitations
as the state itself. Further, Marsh v. Alabama 128 shows that even a private
property owner's making and enforcing of rules for the life of a community
falls within the constitutional command. In Marsh, officials of the company
town of Chickasaw had procured the arrest of a Jehovah's Witness for dis-
tributing religious leaflets on private streets. The Supreme Court held that
though the town was not treated by state law as a political unit, it functioned
as a residential community and its "rulings" must therefore permit the basic
freedoms of expression for those "who live in or come to" the town. Colleges
would seem to come under the rationale of Marsh. College communities are
like company towns in consisting of groups of persons connected with a private
corporation, living on its private property, contracting with it, and subject to
its power. Their rules, like those of the company town, are attempts to regulate
the life of a social community.
129
The inclusion of college communities under constitutional jurisdiction would
not, however, necessarily mean that such institution would be required to fol-
low the same detailed procedure which governs courts or regulatory agencies.
As the Fifth Circuit held in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,'8 0
though a college be subject to constitutional jurisdiction, the content of the
constitutional rule depends on the adaption of general principles to the college
situation and the facts of each case. In Dixon the demands of procedural due
process were said to be satisfied by a semi-formal hearing susceptible of in-
sertion into school routine. Similarly, inclusion of "private" colleges under
constitutional jurisdiction would not necessarily require the application to such
colleges of the existing specific first and fourteenth amendment doctrines. An
extension of constitutional jurisdiction would, however, provide guides for de-
cision of new cases, authority for federal courts to act, and legitimacy for
judicial action to protect personal rights.
Summary
The courts have expressed a reluctance to interfere with university expul-
sions. Whether as a reason or as a mode of expression, courts have discussed
127. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) ;
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) ;
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey). "Having undertaken to
perform an important function relating to the exercise of sovereignty by the people, they
may not violate the fundamental principles laid down by the Constitution for its exercise."
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
128. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
129. Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public
S. . has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that
the channels of communication remain free.... The managers [of Chickasaw] ap-
pointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion.., con-
sistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guaranties.
Id. at 507-08.
130. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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this court-school relation in terms of contract, status, and constitutional
analogies. But courts have been unable or unwilling to recognize the great
freedom available to them within the legal framework provided by those
analogies. Nor have they formulated reasoned principles by which to exercise
that freedom. Only in a few decisions have courts faced up to effective review
-the judicial task of sorting out and assigning priorities to competing policy
considerations, and assessing the institutional demands and capacities of the
university vis-a-vis the courts. The second half of this Comment seeks to
establish the need for greater court review and to raise, if only by suggestion,
the problem which courts have been unwilling to face: their relative compe-
tence in the various aspects of student discipline, and the university's varying
needs for discretion to discipline.
PART II
THE FACTS OF COLLEGE DISCIPLINE
School Interests z. Judicial Interests: Autonomy Balanccd by Social Concern
A. The Need for Judicial Inquiry.
Expulsion, as has been demonstrated, may work a severe social deprivation
upon its subject. This in itself might imply the need for judicial supervision,
even of private institutions, under normal tort principles. An orthodox ap-
proach, however, regards all non-government organizations and associations
as "private," with inherent right to make autonomous decisions.13' From this
right, these groups are said to derive the privilege to inflict deprivations on
others-through exercise of such freedoms as freedom to choose customers, to
associate, and to contract.
While our society has an abhorrence of arbitrary deprivation exemplified
in the rule that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process, 32 the ordinary actions of most private persons are thought to be
sufficiently limited so as not to be intolerably arbitrary. And in economic,
associational, and family relations, deprivations of liberty or property occur as
a matter of course without necessarily incurring the regulation of due process
of law. The competitive pressures of the market, the internal political pressures
of association elections, and the social pressures of mores and expectations are
extra-legal instruments of social control;133 to the extent that these instru-
ments limit deprivations, autonomous power '3 ' may exist without having an
unacceptable potential for tyranny.
131. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718-
19 (1878) ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522, 526 (1898), treating corporations as if they
were natural persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment; but sce Northern Secu-
rities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 362 (1904) (concurring opinion) ; Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
132. . .. nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law... .. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
133. See Exc. Soc. Sc. loc iwim. "social control."
134. Power is the capacity to foreclose alternatives and require desired action from
some other person. See Bierstedt, An Analysis of Social Power, 15 Am. Soc. Rnv. 730
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The growing power of "private" organizations in our society has posed a
problem for courts and commentators; as nominally private institutions have
come to exercise many of the functions traditionally allocated to government, a
need has arisen to protect basic liberties against these new centers of power.
Where societal controls do not function satisfactorily, it falls to the law to use
its skills to reestablish effective pressures limiting arbitrary power. Society has
recognized that private institutions possess potential for arbitrary coercive
power so great as to have grave social effects. Consequently, landmark
cases 135 and imaginative commentators 130 have suggested that those private
(1950). Within a "market," by definition, there are always alternatives and no participant
has "power." Only when power exists must it be regulated.
Compare the underlying rationale of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) that in-
dividuals have power only to "invade" rights but that only the State has power to "destroy"
rights. The individual's actions can be limited by the injured party's ability to go elsewhere,
and to seek redress from the State; only the State has the capacity to injure without rem-
edy, so it is only against the State that "constitutional" limitations are needed.
See also Goldhamer & Shils, Types of Power and Status, 45 Am. J. Soc. 171 (1939).
"A person may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the behavior of others
in accordance with his own intentions." One might add, "even against their will." GETI
& MILLS, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 193-95 (1953). Simmel, though, has pointed
out that, barring brute force, power is not actually exercised against the will of the dom-
inated, rather the stronger person, so structures the alternatives that the subordinate chooses
to obey, rather than suffer the consequences. Subordination "only demands a price for the
realization of freedom-a price, to be sure, which we are not willing to pay." SIMMEL, Tin
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORGE SIMME 181-86 (Wolff ed. 1950) ; to the same effect, BARNARD, THE
FUNcTIONs OF THE EXECUTIVE 161-84 (1938) ; see also Kaysen, How Much Power? What
Scope? in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 85 (Masonr ed. 1959).
135. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (white Democratic primary); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(white Jaybird Democratic Party). Cf. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S, 225
(1956) (union shop agreement under Railway Labor Act).
136. Compare, Justice Douglas: "Should not the corporate giants be considered as
"states"? Is it not naive to think of them as "persons"? Douglas, Book Review, The N.Y.
Times Book Review, Oct. 22, 1961, p. 3, col. 2.
As a beginning, we can set out the following propositions: (1) The Constitution was
framed on the theory that limitations should exist on the formal exercise of power
in government but not on power exercised unofficially. (2) The essential problem of
individual liberty, however, is one of freedom from arbitrary restraints and restric-
tions, wherever and however imposed. (3) The Constitution should be so construed
as to apply to arbitrary applications of power against individuals by centers of private
government. (4) The main flow of group decisions in the factory community would
not be thrown unto litigation or controversy by such constitutional construction, but
only those which directly and substantially affect an individual. (5) It would take
only a slight modification of present constitutional doctrine to effect such a constitu-
tional construction.
MILLER, PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 12 (Occasional Paper for Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1959). See also Ba=z, EcoNomic POWER AND T11R
FREE SocIETY 17-18 (1957); Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate 4ctivity-
Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. Rnv.
933 (1952) ; Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law,
[Vol. 72:13621388
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXPULSIONS
organizations exercising effective power over vital segments of social life be
subject to the same constitutional restrictions as public governments. Betveen
these polar positions of treating powerful institutions as either "private in-
dividuals" or "public governments," a new law of "private governments" is
gradually being developed by legislatures,13 7 courts, 38 and writers.13 0 Recog-
nizing the principles that the exercise of organizational autonomy in decision-
making must be tempered with public responsibility, and that public responsi-
bility is measured by the nature of the organization involved and the depriva-
tion it inflicts, courts have applied or invoked controls appropriate to each in-
stitution. For example, the power of unions over both members 140 and non-
members,' 4 ' the power of political parties over voters,'- and the power of
company towns over residents and visitors 1 43 have all been said to have so
great an unregulated potential for arbitrary deprivation that judicial relief must
be afforded to the injured.
The university shares the characteristics of market autonomy and potential
for deprivation which have led to increased judicial supervision of private
groups. Decisions made by the school can affect the student as immediately and
conclusively as decisions by government itself. The deprivation inflicted
57 CoL.um L. REv. 155, 176-77 (1957) ; Lantham, The Commonwealth of the Corporation,
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 25, 35 (1960) ; Malick, Toward a New Constitutional Status for Labor
Unions: A Proposal, 21 RocKY MT. L. Rv. 260 (1949) ; Miller, The Constitutional Lau
of the Security State, 10 STAN. L. REv. 620, 655-56 (1958) ; Ming, Racial Restrictions and
the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. Ci. L. REv. 203, 234-
38 (1949); PEKErIS, LAw AwD SocIAL. AcTioN 91-128 (1950); Wilson, Antitrust Policy
and Constitutional Theory, 46 CoRx ELL L.Q. 505, 524-31 (1961).
137. E.g., Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29
U.S.C. §§ 501-04 (Supp. III, 1959-61) (government by union of its member) ; Auto Dealer's
Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-24 (Supp. V, 1961) (government by auto manufac-
turer of its dealers).
138. See cases cited notes 94-128, 135 supra, 140 infra.
139. E.g., ApxoLD, FoLxoE oF CAPIrT.IsuS 110-13, 215 (1937) ; Developments in the
Law--Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HIv. L. Ray. 933 (1963);
Manning, Corporate Power and I rdividual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular
Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38 (1960); Schwartz, Institutional Sire and Individual
Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of Big Business, 55 Nw. U.L. Rav. 34 (1960); Selzuick,
The Sociology of Law, 12 J. LEG. ED. 521, 526 (1960).
For discussions with special reference to labor unions, see, e.g., Aaron & Komaroff,
Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 Irt- L. Ray. 425, 631 (1949) ; Sum-
mers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YaE L.J. 175 (1960) ;
Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Urions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL Rav. 483 (1950) ; Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1951); Vellington, The
Constitution, the Labor Union and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1960);
Wirtz, Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953) ; Williams, The Polit-
ical Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TExAs L. REv. 826 (1954).
140. Syresv. Local 23, Oil Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1956) (per curia,,).
141. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
142. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (white Democratic primary); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (white Jaybird Democratic Party).
143. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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-through expulsion is severe in itself and has severe consequences.144 It may
be inflicted arbitrarily, or on the basis of activity which our society considers
most important to be preserved from interference, such as religious and
political behavior.' 45 Moreover, the college's potential to exercise coercion is
substantially unrestrained by market pressures-the student may be said to
have freedom to contract but in fact has only freedom to adhere. When he
"chooses" a university, he must choose a relationship on an "all-or-nothing"
basis. The school, unlike the social club, functions as a multi-purpose institu-
tion; to obtain academic advantages, the student may be required to suffer
social disabilities which, like "unconstitutional conditions" to government pro-
grams, would not ordinarily survive "market" pressures.140 These characteris-
tics suggest the need for abandoning the fiction that the university, any more
than the labor union, is a wholly "private" institution, and suggest the conse-
quent need for adopting more stringent attitudes on review.
B. The Possibility of Judicial Inquiry
Judicial evaluation of conflicting school and student claims is particularly
appropriate because satisfactory legislative solutions are not to be expected.
Students have small political influence, for they may be out-of-staters,
transients, or minors. Universities, on the other hand, have established legisla-
tive channels of contact, and political power as employers, landowners, and
investors. Consequently, the legislative process will probably continue to re-
flect the imbalance of power and fail to establish protections for the weaker
party, the non-voting students, whose weakness is the cause of their need for
governmental protections. Therefore, the courts properly may apply to the
university-student situation the principle that the courts' constituency consists
of those not represented in the political branches 147-that it represents those
otherwise helpless, an idea as old as the chancellor's equitable jurisdiction to
protect minors.' 48
While objection might be made to the institutional costs to courts if they are
required to handle a host of claims, each de minimis in value, these objections do
not necessarily apply to discipline cases. Of the students who are expelled, the
number willing to bear the expense of litigation has never been great; nor is
there reason to think that colleges would, by failing to conform their policies to
court-imposed standards, produce a flood of litigation. And no matter how
many suits are brought, the value of the items in controversy is great,1 49 and
-as a court long ago observed-students have a right no smaller than that
144. See notes 4-12 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 13-16 and, 71 supra.
146. Compare works cited note 139 supra.
147. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See Shapiro,
Judicial Modesty, Political Realty and Preferred Position, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 175, 198-200
(1962).
148. See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wins. 103, 118, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (1722);
JAcoDs & GoEBEL, CASES oN DomEsTIc RELATION S 880 (4th ed. 1961).
149. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
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of other citizens to have their interests adjudicated in the courts.?-0 Whether
the court's role in student discipline cases is conceived of as the giving of re-
lief for an intentional injury, as a balancing and harmonizing of interests, or
as a reviev for fundamental fairness of semi-autonomous decisions, the func-
tion is one in which the court has long experience. Indeed, if the discipline
problem is conceived of as a reconciliation of institutional authority and in-
dividual rights, then no other institution in society is more competent to play
such a role than the courts.
C. The Need for Factual Inquiry
The conclusion that courts should provide a more effective review of uni-
versity expulsions than they now do leads to the question of what form the
court's analysis of facts and law should take. Judicial analysis of discipline
cases by analogy to commercial contract, to parents, or to the state is inade-
quate. As discussed in Part I, the usual use of these analogies-in truncated
form-hides the great freedom to reach alternative results which they provide.
But even where the full possibilities implied in each of the analogies is ap-
preciated by the court, the analogies cannot satisfactorily guide a court to a
desirable result by the force of their inherent logic. Each analogy provides a
legal vocabulary in which conflicting solutions of basic questions can be ex-
pressed. And the rules purporting to govern the analogous field may turn on
terms relatively devoid of content-such as "inherent," "reasonable," "arbi-
trary," "implied," or "abuse of discretion." Even should it appear that a doc-
trinally-dictated result ensues from an analogous fact-situation, the judge ap-
plying such a result to school discipline runs the risk of substantive irrele-
vancy; the unique character of the university as an institution makes transla-
tion of policies difficult. And were a judge merely to purport to find decision
in a school case to be dictated by the use of analogy, the masking of other
factors actually influencing the decision would impair the ability of counsel and
commentators to formulate reasoned arguments on the determinative issues.
Proliferation of the purpose of a rule of law, by borrowing it from an
analogous fact-situation, is an acceptable mode of judicial procedure where
the court can be clear about the content of the rule, the relevance of its pur-
poses to the case at hand, and the effect on competing interests of the ap-
plication of the rule. But only an understanding of the fact-situation before it
-the needs and capacities of student, school, and court in relation to discipline
-- can satisfactorily guide the court in its choices among competing analogies,
and among conflicting results possible within each analogy. The needs and
capacities of school, student, and court must necessarily play the primary role
in deciding the legal relationships to exist among them. Analogy may then
be used as an instructive, but incidental, mode of weaving results into the
fabric of the law. As a legitimating step for prior conclusions, it must be pre-
ceded by careful inquiry into competing functions and the fact situations in
which they operate.
150. Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 2 Pa. County Ct. 459 (1836); 3 Pa.
County Ct. 77 (1887).
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D. The Question of Justiciability
Given the fact of an expulsion brought to the court's attention by litigation,
a court will ask itself how it may best proceed. A logical first question is that
of justiciability: is the discipline a penalty, and has the court the institutional
competence to evaluate the manner of, or reasons for, its application? If so,
the court will wish to identify those factors present in the situation which
are relevant to its decision on reinstatement and will need appropriate legal
standards and presumptions by which to determine the cumulative effect of
those factors.
In the great majority of cases expulsion will constitute a penalty. As con-
trasted to probation, suspension, and other lesser measures, expulsion involves
a complete severance of relationship. Therefore it almost always reflects a
decision to favor the interests of the school or some other parties, rather than
the "best interests of the student."' 1, As a result, schools would appear unable
to assert (as they might for lesser forms of discipline) that the purpose of their
action was not punishment.
In excluding the student, the school may be seeking to further one of several
institutional goals. First, it may be seeking to make its limited academic re-
sources available to those who can make most effective use of them. Such
exclusion, even if denominated expulsion, then signifies a judgment that the
student can not satisfy the school's self-defined educational standards, and
may not be a penalty. Second, the school may seek to preserve academic
standards generally, by punishing those who trespass against canons of aca-
demic honesty. Expulsion then connotes that the student has so offended the
behavioral standards of his calling as a student that he is not fit to continue in
it, or in the professions to which it may lead. Here the likelihood is far greater
that other schools will share identical standards and that expulsion will func-
tion as a judgment of unfitness for further education generally. Third, the
school, as institution rather than as educator, may have self-protective goals--
preserving order within itself, preserving relationships with geographic or
financial communities upon which it depends, inculcating habits of self-en-
forcement of rules among its students generally-which on occasion require
the excision of an offending student. Here expulsion expresses the institution's
displeasure at student activity, whether to reduce the likelihood of disorder, to
show concern for injury done to others, to protect reputation, to enforce
caution in potential malfeasants, or merely to vindicate the school's authority.
The degree of judicial inquiry into expulsions depends also upon considera-
tion of the institutional ability of courts to make reasoned assessments of
school disciplinary situations. The judge, although skilled in rule application,
is not an expert in matters of academic accomplishment and educational policy.
Where the propriety of a decision turns upon questions of academic necessities,
evaluation of scholarship, educational benefits, or the like, the relative su-
periority of the educators' expertise over the courts' seems to require judicial
151. The "polar star" of domestic relations law is said to be "the best interests of the
child." See, e.g., Maudlin v. Maudlin, 68 Idaho 64, 72, 188 P.2d 323, 327 (1948).
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reluctance to undertake review of a decision--even one inflicting great de-
privation. Colleges and many courts each have experience, however, in the
character training of youth. Indeed, in matters of order, safety and reputation
the court may have a wider experience than the school; in punitive discipline
it is the court rather than the school that has a special expertise. A similar
range of relative competence exists as to knowledge of the specific facts of
a given case. If the college's decision was based on specific incidents, the col-
lege has no more advantage over a reviewing body with discretionary de ntovo
jurisdiction than would a jury or fact-finding judge. If the college's action is
based on a diagnosis of a student's total personality, on the other hand, its
conclusions can be meaningfully reviewed only to the extent that an expert wit-
ness's could. This need for awareness of limitations upon judicial capabilities
suggests that any inquiry by a judge must take into account the operative factors
contributing to, or detracting from, his expertise.
More important than the probability that courts are unfitted to make educa-
tional decisions in deciding the proper relationship of the court to school and
student is the university's legitimate interest in autonomy-the freedom to
learn, the freedom to teach, the freedom to inquire, and the freedom to shape
policies to fulfill its basic goal. It is assumed, of course, that the university's
central goal is the education of its students; within broad limits, the defini-
tion of education must be established by the school's own conception of its
mission -within the world of knowledge. While the latter is an interest of the
university as an institution, justified by our society's value on pluralism, free-
dom to learn, to teach, and to inquire are part of the academic freedom of
teachers and students, necessary if they are to perform their educational func-
tions.152 Any infringement by courts, by legislatures, even by university non-
teaching staff, on academic freedom would, obviously, be undesirable. Judicial
review of academic expulsions, therefore, should be as limited as possible, to
avoid invasion of the classroom. But judicial review of expulsions based on
school concern with order, safety, or reputation would not usually pose a
threat to the autonomy of the faculty, nor present a problem of competency to
reviewing courts. And the school's institutional autonomy in shaping the
policies by which it seeks its goal will rarely be called into question in expulsion
cases. Moreover, respect for school autonomy does not require judicial absten-
tion; contrary policy may be of superior weight, as tie Flag Salute Cases 153
demonstrate.
"Educational" expulsions, for extra-academic reasons, e.g., character train-
ing, would generally not present the same consideration of academic freedom.
152. "Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding, otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 234 (1957) (per Warren, C.J.).
153. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Miners-
vilte School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of official authority depend
upon our possession of marked competence in the field where the invasion of rights
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However, another factor may weigh against judicial review of certain of these
expulsions. A school may have genuine therapeutic purposes when it re-
quires a student to leave despite the fact that he has satisfied minimal academic
requirements. For many private colleges, "education" includes as central to
its purpose such non-academic aspects as character training, and a student's
character development may thus be important to the school's determination of
a student's continued fitness to remain. If a school's declarations, practice and
procedures-such as psychotherapeutic inquiry 154-show that such are the rea-
sons for a given expulsion, 55 the court ought properly to limit its review to
avoid exceeding its competence or infringing on vital interests of the school.
Where expulsions are based on academic dishonesty, the court's inquiry
may be conditioned on the particular academic crime involved and the manner
in which the school deals with it. Thus, where the decision to expel is made by
academic personnel, and is based upon such an academic judgment as whether
or not material is plagiarized, a court may defer to special competence much
as it would in the case of academic failure. But where an allegation of crime-
even one related to academic performance-is dependent on non-academic
facts, as cheating on examinations may be, or is established by the school in
a manner not involving academic judgment, the court is competent to review
the appropriateness of the school's decision. The school has, it must be ad-
mitted, greater concern with academic than with other forms of student mis-
behavior. But unless the decisions it makes require academic expertise, this
concern ought not to preclude a court from judging for itself. Evaluation of
fact-finding to determine the occurrence of crime is standard business for
the courts.
When the school expels to safeguard its institutional interests, rather than to
achieve its educational goals, court review is particularly appropriate. In serv-
ing these interests the school is unlikely to have the special competence or con-
cern which it enjoys in its central role. And, since it is only the school-student
academic relationship in which the two may be said to direct their activities
towards a shared goal, when a dispute between student and school involves
other roles they play, their legitimate interests may conflict greatly. Thus, the
unlikelihood that the school will reflect adequately the extent of the student's
legitimate interests necessitates court review to achieve such a weighing. Here,
especially, the school is judge in its own cause.
In some cases, the court ought properly to grant review because of charac-
teristics of the effect on the student, regardless of alleged educational charac-
teristics of the university's act. Such need for judicial inquiry is established
when it is claimed that the school has infringed such basic interests as freedom
occurs.... We act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by the
force of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence
in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenti-
cates as the function of this Court when, liberty is infringed.
319 U.S. at 639-40.
154. See text at notes 188-90 infra.
155. See text accompanying note 172 inlra.
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of speech-both to speak and to hear-freedom of the press, freedom of as-
sembly, right to political activity, freedom of religion, or the right to privacy.
Our society depends on its courts to make the ultimate decision as to the pro-
priety of such infringements-a responsibility which is not to be delegated to
university officials, even where they claim superiority founded upon educational
expertise 156
Student Interests v. School Interests: Reasonable Riles Reasonably Applied
Thus, effective judicial review seems called for whenever a balance of the
capabilities of schools and courts reveals that schools are not the dearly su-
perior arbiters of the students' fate. As the case law establishes, it is by the
fundamental standard of reasonableness-requiring both reasonable rules and
reasonable application-that a court evaluates the expulsions over which it
exercises review.15 7 How should a court go about establishing the content of
this standard?
Some of the cases involving schoolmaster discipline hold that the only be-
havior outside the school which may be regulated is that with a direct and im-
mediate effect on the classroom or the teacher-student relationship, such as the
destruction of schoolbooks or the ridiculing of a teacher' r s Similarly, some
student groups and educators have suggested that, except to the extent that
such student behavior interferes with the university's academic functioning, it
should not be regulated by the school.'5 9 Thus, it is argued, the student would
156. Note 153 supra.
157. See text at notes 68-70 supra.
158. See, e.g., Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 121 (1860).
159. The National Student Congress, composed of representatives of the student gov-
ernments of the major part of American colleges, has adopted this "Basic Policy Declara-
tion" on In Loco Parentis:
Equally important are the effects of in loco parentis doctrine on the changing
student Paternalism in, any form induces or reinforces immaturity, conformity, and
disinterest among those whose imagination, critical talent and capacities for integrity
and growth should be encouraged and given opportunity for development.
... [Admittedly, w]e can see justification and even a necessity in the enforce-
ment of such intellectual discipline as is found in a core-curriculum, in such social
disciplines as is necessary to maintain order in the classroom.... However, those
forms of discipline which can be justified on the basis of this formula are few and
scarce, and the danger is great that illegitimate paternalism will be confused with
proper control.
U.S. NATIONAL STUDENT AssocrATioN, CODrFicATION OF PoucY, 1961-62, p. 31.
The restriction of university interest to the academic has been urged by Robert Hut-
chins, former Chancellor of the University of Chicago and Dean of the Yale Law School,
as a matter of effective allocatior of resources:
... The university gets involved in trying to chaperone its students and soon finds
that it's spending its money and, what's more important, its attention on the job.
And, since there's only a limited amount of time, intelligence, and money around a
place, it has to be carefully used.
U.S. NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION, IN Loco PAnENTis, pp. IlM, 11-4 (Johnston 1962).
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be allowed the personal freedom necessary for his self-education, and the
school would be able to concentrate its limited resources on its central tasks.100
The ordinary community police and courts would be sufficient to protect
society against the misdeeds of students, as against those of other persons; stu-
dents accused of crime would have the protections of trial at common law be-
fore punishment would be imposed. This suggested standard may not suf-
ficiently recognize the university's own status as a community; but if it is re-
jected on this basis, recognition of the university's community status raises the
need for other guides for decision.
When the capacity of or need for a court to afford effective judicial review of
an expulsion is clear, it must judge the propriety of the expulsion by evalating
and comparing the competing interests of the school and student, to determine
the minimal requirements-both procedural and substantive-to be met by
the school. The substantive requirements imposed on school expulsions should
vary with the limitation on conduct occasioned by obedience to a regulation,
and the limitation occasioned by punishment for disobedience of a regulation,
both of which are deprivations of a substantial order. In addition to consider-
ing these deprivations and the interests of the school, a court should also
scrutinize the procedures by which the regulation was established and the stu-
dent expelled. The reinstatement of an expelled student on procedural grounds
avoids explicitly questioning the freedom of the school to achieve its sub-
stantive goals despite conflicting student interests ;101 such a judicial technique
allows a court to dispose of a case on the issues as to which it has most
competence, and also safeguards the student by dictating that school goals be
achieved in accordance with established minimal safeguards. In the discussion
that follows, the school infringements on a student's freedom of expression, on
his other especially valued liberties, and on his activities in general, will be
considered in turn, followed by a discussion of factors governing the reason-
ableness of proceedings for expulsion.
160. Ibid.
161. As to the propensity to reverse on procedural rather than on, substantive grounds,
the following Fable, by Ambrose Bierce seems in point:
"THE PARTY OVER THERE
A Man in a Hurry, whose watch was at his lawyer's, asked a Grave Person the
time of day.
"I heard you ask that Party Over There the same question," said the Grave
Person. "What answer did he give you?"
"He said it was about three o'clock," replied the Man in a Hurry; "but he did
not look at his watch, and as the sun is nearly down I think it is later."
"The fact that the sun is nearly down," the Grave Person said, "is immaterial,
but the fact that he did not consult his timepiece and make answer after due delibera-
tion and consideration is fatal. The answer given," continued the Grave Person, con-
sulting his own timepiece, "is of no effect, invalid and void."
"What, then," said the Man in a Hurry, eagerly, "is the time of day?" "The
question is remanded to the Party Over There for a new answer," replied the Grave
Person returning his watch to his pocket and moving away with great dignity.
He was a Judge of an Appellate Court.
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A. "Reasonable Rules": Limits of Substance
Expulsions are sometimes imposed where the form or content of student
self-expression violates school policy.162 But liberty of expression occupies a
preferred place in our scheme of values. The policy considerations that require
its protection against government interference suggest the necessity of its pro-
tection from interference by universities. Infringement on this freedom is
not to be easily tolerated merely because it emuanates from private sources of
oppression.lea In the case of the university, society's interest in free and open
debate, including the rights of assembly, association, and publication 161 and
the right of all to hear and speak even unpopular ideas 165 is particularly
strong-the university is needed as a source of the new ideas which a democ-
racy constantly requires. 06 Thus, relevant legal doctrines, such as the doctrine
162. See cases cited note 71 supra.
And expulsions are but one expression of a campus environment restricting free thought
and expression. The New York Times concluded after a survey of 72 major American col-
leges that
[a] subtle, creeping paralysis of freedom of thought and speech is attacking college
campuses ... limiting both student and faculty in the areas traditionally reserved
for free exploration of knowledge and truth. They take a variety of forms.
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1951, p. 29, col. 8.
163. The union member has been held to have a right under statutory "free speech"
protection to be free of union discipline in speaking his mind and spreading his opinions on
union matters. Because "the union. is not a political unit to whose disinterested tribunals an
alleged defamer can look for an impartial review of his 'crime," union authorities are re-
stricted to their remedy in the courts if the member oversteps into the area of libel. Salz-
handler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963).
164. A survey of 141 colleges and universities with enrollments over 500 reveals that
in 85% of the institutions without accredited schools of journalism, it was the administration
policy to supervise the content of the campus newspaper. Among the colleges with accredited
schools of journalism, where the newspaper is a school "laboratory," only 6S% reported
that student editors were supervised. 29 JoumAmsm QuAarsLy 62 (Winter 1952). Among
the schools which did not supervise the newspapers, such indirect controls as administration
appointment of editors were sometimes employed. Id. at 65. See also Editor & Publisher,
Sept. 27, 1952, p. 48.
Editors attending the First Student Editorial Affairs Conference, sponsored by the U.S.
National Student Association, listed the following forms of abridgment of the freedom of
the press of college publications as currently being practiced: confiscation of student news-
papers because of the publication of controversial material; suspension, expulsion, or threats
thereof against student editors because of the publication, actual or proposed, of controver-
sial material; censorship of newspaper content by faculty, administration, student govern-
ment, civil or ecclesiastical authorities; financial pressure to censor articles and editorials
on controversial matters; "inordinate" and "excessive" social pressure to prevent publica-
tion of particular articles or opinion. 85 SCHOOL & Soc"ry 361 (1957). Post-publication
retaliation ranges from reprimand to expulsion. 61 CoLU,.IA Umvmrry Buu.nw-,
Number 25, pp. 171-72.
165. A survey of state supported institutions indicated that 175 schools--over 42% of
those polled-did not allow their facilities to be used by political speakers. Van Alstyne,
Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 328 n.1 (1963).
166. The university student should be exposed to competing opinions and beliefs in
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of university "reasonable rules," should be construed as to further society's
interest in freedom of expression, by preventing university incursions upon
student freedoms.
And the university and the students themselves have special interests in free-
dom of expression. Such free discussion and debate is not only necessary for
the proper functioning of our political and social system, it is also regarded as
an essential catalyst in the process of individual fulfillment. The essence of the
tradition of a liberal arts education is the freedom to examine all ideas, what-
ever their current state of acceptability. Even if society did not value freedom
to hear and to speak, those liberties would be a central interest of the stu-
dent.167 Protection of speech prerogatives is called for, a fortiori, where school
every field, so that he may learn to weigh them and gain maturity of judgment....
Whatever criticism is occasioned, by these practices, the universities are committed
to them by their very nature. To curb them, in, the hope of avoiding criticism, would
mean distorting the true process of learning and depriving society of its benefits ...
It would deny society one of -its most fruitful sources of strength and welfare and
represent a sinister change in our ideal of government.
Statement, Association of American Universities, March 24, 1953. EMERSON & HAEnR,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1070, 1073 (1958). The AAU is the national conference of
college presidents.
Harvard University has proven the workability of the absence of campus censor-
ship in higher education....
The standard which should be applied in both public and private institutions Is
this: any written idea of discussion or speaker should be permitted full exposure on
the campus, so long as the basic purpose of the exposure is not to violate the law.
Anything short of this, we think is inimical to a free society.... The constitutional
principles of our democracy, as well as the basic strength of our society, require
unfettered free inquiry in all institutions of higher learning .... The most important
"market" [for ideas] is the university campus. All who are concerned with academic
freedom-administrators, teachers, yes, and lawyers and judges, too-should fight
every attempt, however well-intentioned, to block unpopular speakers, discussions
and writing for our institutions of higher learning.
Report, Committee on the Bill of Rights, the Association, of the Bar of the City of New
York, 1962. See also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 15 (1961).
For judicial recognition of this special level of interest, see, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 197-98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (per Warren, C.J.) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
167. The college which wishes to set an example of openminded inquiry in, its class-
rooms will defeat its purpose if it denies the same right of inquiry to its students
outside the classroom-or if it imposes rules which deny them the freedom to make
their own choices, wise or unvise. Limitations on the freedom of students are not
then to be seen. as simple administrative decisions which adjust the school to the pre-
vailing climate of public opinion.. The college's policy vis-a-vis its students goes to
the heart of the condition necessary for adequate personal growth and this deter-
mines whether an' institution, of higher education turns out merely graduates or the
indispensible human, material for a continuing democracy....
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS
IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 4 (1961).
The notion that education consists in, the authoritative inculcation of what the teacher
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charters or other controlling documents stress the need for devotion to unfet-
tered inquiry and free expression.'0 5
Applying the experience it has gathered in protecting free expression, a
court might strike down as unreasonable any regulation which has the effect of
depriving students of some or all of that freedom. Thus, regulations which
prohibit the existence of political organizations, or prohibit all campus meet-
ings on political subjects, or prohibit speakers of an unpopular viewpoint from
speaking, would be unreasonable. 60 On the other hand, regulations which
specify the time and place of meetings, modes of registering activities and
publicizing them, and similarly non-burdensome housekeeping rules to pro-
mote safety, order, and convenience, would seem entirely proper.
deems true may be logical and appropriate in a convent, or a seminary for priests,
but it is intolerable in universities and public schools, from primary to professional.
Inaugural speech of President Eliot of Harvard University, PRIMEm OF INTELLECTUAL FREE-
DOM 15 (Harvard Univ. 1949).
An ideal of the liberal arts university tradition was sketched by Thomas Jefferson,
founder of the University of Virginia, in a letter to prospective faculty members stating
that it would "be bas d on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not
afraid to follow truth\ vherever it may lead, nor to tolerate error so long as reason is free
to combat it" BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FaF. MEN 203 (1951).
168. See, e.g., the declaration of purpose of the University of Wisconsin:
WHATEVER MAY BE THE LnrrATIONS WHIcH TaAMEL INgQURY ELSEWnRE,
WE BELrEVE THAT THE GREAT STATE UNIVERSITY OF WIscoNsiN SuouLD EvER
ENCOURAGE THAT CONTINUAL AND FEARLEss SIFTING AND WrNNOWING By Wilcir
ALONE THE TRUTH CAN BE FOUND. Bronze tablet in the wall of the main building
of the University of Wisconsin.
PRIMER oF, INTELLECTUAL FREEDM 65 (Harvard Univ., 1949) ; college charters in BAtr-
LETT, op. cit. mpra note 115.
169. The student government, student organizations, and individual students should be
free to discuss, pass resolutions upon, distribute leaflets, circulate petitions, and take
other lawful action respecting any matter which directly or indirectly concerns or
affects them.
AMERIcAx CiviL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREF.DOM LmERnEs OF STUDENTS n; COL-
LEGES AND UxmwRsrriEs 4 (1961).
Students should enjoy the same right as other citizens to hear different points of view
and draw their own conclusion. ...
Id. at 7.
No disciplinary action, should be taken by the college against a student for engaging
in such off-campus activities as political campaigning, picketing or participation in
public demonstrations, provided the student does not claim without authorization to
speak or act in the name of the college or one of its student organizations. In their
off-campus life, students should not be shackled by college control, nor should the
college be held responsible for the off-campus activities of its individual students....
When students choose to participate in activities that result in police action, such
as demonstrations against segregation, the civilian, defense program or nuclear tests,
it is an infringement of their liberty for the college to punish such activity.
Id. at 11.
The fact that student expression off-campus is not so infringed would not -ave the
campus prohibition from unreasonableness, any more than a community's limitation of a
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Between these two poles would fall regulations intended to promote some
legitimate university goal, extrinsic to expression, but which had a necessary
effect of severely limiting expression. An example of such a rule would be a
requirement that'a student on probation not participate in extra-curricular
activities, including off-campus political meetings.170 To determine the proprie-
ty of such a requirement, the court might weigh the interests involved, as well
as the degree of their involvement: a school rule established for some purpose
ancillary or peripheral to the school's self-declared central goal represents a
lesser school interest than a rule directly promoting that central goal.171 A
prohibition on controversial speakers imposed to protect school's good relations
with its geographic or financial communities effects an interest less central to
the college's purpose than, perhaps, a ban of novels stressing sexuality by a
college dedicated to special standards of morality. Similarly, the school's inter-
est in guidance of the educational experiences of its students may be more
directly involved in a limitation of unauthorized tutorship, than unauthorized
publications; of visiting professors, than student-invited speakers; of unauthor-
ized study-groups, than clubs or gatherings without permission. And faculty
control of the professional standards of a school publication-whether a news-
paper of a journalism school or a poetry magazine of an English department-
more directly involves a school's central purposes than university control of
burden on religious freedom to its borders saves it from unconstitutionality. Cf. Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Students at English universities have claimed, and apparently regularly receive, the
rights
(1) To free expression, of opinion by speech and Press.
(2) To organize meetings, discussions, and studies on all subjects within the UnI-
versity precincts.
(3) To belong to any organization, whether cultural, political or religious.
(4) To participate to the full in all activities outside the University, and to collab-
orate with extra-University organizations.
NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS, CHARTER OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS AND REsrosniLiTiEs
(1940). Compare "Student Bill of Responsibilities and Rights," in U.S. NATIONAL STUDENTr
ASSOCIATION, CODIFICATION OF POLICY 1962-63, pp. 38-40. But for the practice of some
American schools, see note 164 supra.
170. See the discussions of Zarichny v. State Board, at note 71 supra, and Steier v.
Board of Higher Educ., at note 6 supra.
171. Of course, there is always the public relations problem-does the John Birch unit
or the Khrushchev Fan Club of a given college represent the college? Of course
not. The p.r. problem is only avoided by pretending that there are not kooks of this
kind on campus. It is met by educating the public that It Takes All Kinds and any
college is likely to have its share.
The point, I guess, is that a university is not a religious community, a political com-
munity, or a social fellowship: it is an intellectual community. On religious, political,
social grounds no community is possible; therefore no group organized along these
lines "represents" the university. The public should be educated to know this.
Comments in response to a survey of leading educators on in loco parentss. Letter, John
Cogley to U.S. National Student Association, Sept. 16, 1961. (All responses on file in library
of, and available from U.S. National Student Association.)
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publication content for reasons of institutional self-protection. Moreover, if an
interest can be served by alternative measures which are less depriving than
the challenged regulation, then that regulation cannot be considered required
by the interest.
Principles similar to those suggested for speech cases might be found to gov-
ern questions of freedom of religion. If imposed only for an ancillary adminis-
trative purpose of the school, no limitation on a student's religious freedom
would be reasonable. If, however, a school's central purpose included religious
or moral education, then the school's freedom of religion would seem to justify
supervision of these aspects of the student's right and the exclusion of students
who violated religious canons. But where a student's misdeed wvas religious in
nature, consideration of his religious freedom as against the school's would
seem to require that expulsion be phrased so as to operate only as an exclusion
of one no longer qualified for religious companionship, rather than as the ut-
most sanction of dishonorable expulsion, expulsion of a sort likely to bar pro-
fessional career paths, or denial of a degree already earned. 172 To establish that
a religious requirement was indeed central to a school's purpose, a court might
rely upon its representations in catalogs and public statements, the warnings
of enforcement of religious rules that it made to its students, its past enforce-
ment of such rules, and its other activities. A school could not have a religious
purpose, of course, if that were prohibited in its charter, by its founders, or in
other authoritative instructions, as is the case in "state" schools.173
When a valuable student interest other than freedom of expression is limited
by university action, even regulation for administrative institutional purposes
arguably might be found to meet the standards of "reasonable rules." 74 Out
of respect for the school's autonomy in determining its own goals, the court
172. Arguably, on the same principle of exclusion with minimum deprivations, such
a student should not be expelled in mid-semester, but instead required to transfer after
completion of courses then in, midcourse, and perhaps restricted to minimum campus con-
tacts in the interim period.
On this analysis, the St. John's University expulsions for participating in a religious
civil marriage ceremony were unwarrantedly severe. Three seniors were expelled in mid-
semester; the fourth expelled had already completed all coursework towards the degree.
See note 7 supra and note 173 infra.
173. Applying this analysis to Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d
403, rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.YS.2d 410, aff'd incn., 12 N.Y2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d
834 (1962), it is doubtful whether the school was a "religious" one under the test here
used. Non-Catholics were admitted to the university community as students; indeed, the
school seems never to have filed the statutory certificate which would have declared it a
religious school authorized to refuse admission on religious grounds. See N.Y. Educ. Law,
§ 313. Thus the school was not one which could justify exclusion of tile non-orthodox out
of fear of contamination by the non-orthodox. St. Johns University justified the expulsion
because of the "scandal" the civil marriage had caused, but "scandal" is a term of art in
canon law referring to a reaction of the Catholic community to a major sin of a Catholic-
expelling the students could not have "avoided a scandal" ir the sense of keeping the in-
cident secret. The conclusion seems to be that the expulsion was intended as a retributive
or deterrent penalty, and thus unreasonable under the analysis here presented.
174. But see note 159 supra and accompanying text.
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might require no more of a connection between regulation and school goal than
the minimum tests of relevance and rationality defined by jurists under the
rubric of substantive due process. 75 These other interests, which have been
termed the "common rights" or "liberty" of the citizen, would include such so-
cial freedoms as the right to marry, the right to choice of residence, and the
right to privacy in name, person, dwelling and personal possessions.11 0
Racially discriminatory regulations, and expulsions used to enforce them,
may similarly be evaluated on the basis of the interests of student, school, and
societyy 7 Such school actions are demeaning to both Negro and white stu-
dents; insult to personal dignity would be sufficient at common law to destroy
the school's privilege to punish. The courts now also recognize that racial slights
render education more difficult; the interests of student as student, and of uni-
versity as educator, would therefore seem to require the invalidation of racial
expulsion. Though some schools might choose to teach the perspective of dis-
crimination in their classes or on their campus, overriding public policy suggests
that racially biased institutions, unlike religious schools, could not successfully
invoke the societal interests in pluralism and school autonomy to justify ex-
pulsions perpetuating the policies of discriminatory school founders or faculty.
118
As in the case of religious regulations, this issue has been closed for state
schools.
A third range of student interests imposed upon by school regulation consists
of those beyond the range of the common rights or liberties, including behavior
identified by society as well as the university community as contrary to public
welfare. Where such conduct occurs, it may betray a greater need for institu-
tional discipline than is present when violations of a less anti-social nature take
place; moreover, the university, because of the destructive nature of such acts,
has a greater need to express disapprobation. Since conduct contrary to the
175. If there is rational justification for the expulsion in the college's orderly func-
tioning or its socially approved goals as an educational institution, the dismissals will
not be condemned as arbitrary .... Judicial review was strictly limited to the scope
of the regulation, its reasonableness, and the bona fides, not the wisdom, of the dis-
cretion exercised under it. The approach is in essence one of substantive due process.
Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law-The Right to Judicial
Review, 34 J. HIGHER ED. 250, 253 (1963).
When deciding on the validity of the act of a "private government" under this test two
factors distinguishing the test from that applied to legislative decisions are that the initial
decision-maker whose choice is being reviewed was not a public official sworn to consider
the general good, and that the concerns of the "private legislature" are not all-encompass-
ing but limited. Though a court could find an enactment acceptable under this test If it was
a valid means towards any of the goals a legislature might seek, in dealing with a "private
government's enactment" a court must test the act first as a means towards the linited
goals, and second, as a potential detriment to wider public goals.
176. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
177. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
178. See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), on remnand, Re
Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). Clark, Charitable
Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979
(1957).
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public welfare is of low value, arguably any countervailing university interest
-as in protecting its reputation-would be sufficient to render reasonable the
regulation of the behavior through the threat or actuality of expulsion.11 0 But
in defining such regulations, the schools' approximation to community stand-
ards must satisfy the court as genuine, 8 0 and the behavior regulated must occur
within areas of time and space such that it is genuinely relevant to university
community interests. It would seem that the university's interest would be far
greater where behavior occurred in public rather than in private places, even
the university's own dormitories.' 8 ' And it would seem improper to expel a
student for behavior of a kind commonly allowed by parents of children of his
age or younger unless prohibition of the activity were of substantial importance
to the central aims of the school.
B. Reasonable Rules: Limits of Promulgation
Additional problems are raised by otherwise permissible rules which are
adopted after the student has acted in reliance on their absence, or are enforced
on the basis of acts occurring before the student has received notice of them.
The value placed on the school's autonomy might require that it be free to
establish new behavior requirements to be enforced against its students. But
enforcement of rules unpublished to the student, or enforcement of rules ex post
facto, is contrary to our sense of justice.'82 And newly-established school rules
which substantially alter the school's character or requirements may constitute
a substantial undermining of the student's basis for choice of one university as
against another. Thus, a procedural standard as to the promulgation of rules
may be called for.
The first problem which arises in this regard is that of student knowledge of
the present rule structure. Since the student population is a rotating one, with
a new generation every four years, the codification of explicit rules may be the
179. But see note 159 supra and accompanying text.
180. A Cornell University report referred to
the chronic complaint [that students] are not allowed to enjoy that reasonable meas-
ure of privacy in their social relations with one another that is now commonly ex-
tended in this country to young people, even of high school age.
Indeed,
at Cornell, a 27 year-old graduate student was expelled for having sharcd an off-
campus apartment with a young woman-not a Cornell student but an undergraduate
at a teacher's college-during the summer months.... The student did not deny the
charge but insisted that his off-campus life was his own business.
Hechinger & Hechinger, College Morals Mirror Our Society, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1963,
§ 6, p. 22, col. 1, p. 122, col. 2 ("Reflecting wide social changes in the postwar American
scene, today's college generation is in open revolt against official codes of campus morality").
181. The common student request is for privacy in their social affairs. Universities,
rather than merely regulating public behavior, often. require that social entertainment be
public-requiring that room doors be kept open or sending "inspectors" to check rooms.
Hechinger & Hechinger, supra note 180, at 120, col. 2.
182. See Lambert v. People of California, 355 U.S. 225, 230 (1957) ; Hotch v. United
States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
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only practical way of communicating the specific expectations of the university
to its students. Such promulgation in itself, without disciplinary enforcement,
would serve the valid purposes of setting norms for the edification and educa-
tion of the students, and of condemning undesirable behavior without unneces-
sarily punishing any particular person to serve these purposes. It might not be
necessary in all cases for rules to be written to give fair warning; perhaps such
rules as those respecting academic honesty can be taken as understood, even
with neither proof of fair warning nor proof of actual notice. Outside the pure-
ly academic rules, however, requirements can not with sufficient certainty be
said to be known by students; proof of fair warning cannot be dispensed with.
Nor should vague declarations about ungentlemanly behavior be said to have
given adequate notice of the prohibitions, unless in the situation of application
they have been universally acknowledged, detailed, and long-enforced without
codification. In sum, the category of unwritten rules should be narrowly limited;
full written notice is the preferred goal.
1 83
-As another means of meeting promulgation requirements, a school might
secure actual consent of parent or student by obtaining signature to a copy of
detailed rules at time of application, when the student still has the option of
going to another school. Knowledge of the rules enforced at the several schools
to which he might apply would enable the applicant to exercise some actual
choice over the rules by which he was to be governed, and competitive pressures
among universities might thus exert some limitation upon the rules enacted.
Or parents or students could be presented by the university with a framework
of regulations providing for alternative options.184 The detailing of regulations
in advance for student consent provides a standard of notice both just and
183. Regulations governing the behavior of students should be fully and clearly fornu-
lated, published, and made available to the whole academic community. They should
be reasonable and realistic. Overelaborate rules that seek to govern student conduct
in every detail tend either to be respected in the breach, or to hinder the development
of mature attitudes. As a rule, specific definitions are preferable to such general
criteria as "conduct unbecoming to a student" or "against the best interests of the
institution" which allow for a wide latitude of interpretation.
AMERIcAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENlTS
IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1961).
But it has been suggested by one with a more therapeutic than disciplinary prospective
that a detailed written code is overly stultifying to the growth of student responsibility, and
that college rules should do no more than lay down broad principles. Interview with Dr.
Robert Arnstein, Psychiatrist-in-Chief, Yale University, May, 1963.
184. For examples of the workings of such a system see, e.g.,
University Regulations.
Women Residents Only.
B. Curfews: Weekend nights .... Most parents specify on an annual permission
card, "Overnight Permissions," but some parents prefer to write a personal note
before each specific overnight permission.
E. Senior Privileges. . . . Senior Women shall be allowed extended evening
privileges subject to the following conditions ... They must have the previous writ-
ten permission of their parents.
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY STUDENT UNION HANDBOOK 1959-1960, pp. 95, 97, 99.
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easily applied by courts. What is more, the university would benefit by seeking
such uncoerced consent both by securing advance student knowledge of official
expectations about his behavior, and by obtaining an annual guide as to the sort
of supervision expected of it.
The conflicting student and school interests as to new rules may be reconciled
by requiring that rules involving substantial change be promulgated sufficiently
in advance of their enforcement to enable the student to conform his conduct
to the realities of the new situation. For major changes, the school might be
restricted to application against future students only, on the basis of notice in-
cluded in or with the catalog sent to applicants, stating the purposes and de-
tails of school rules and requirements. For example, where a progressive ex-
perimental college decided to establish a new campus atmosphere reflecting
Episcopalian tradition, students who had entered the school relying on its former
character might legitimately have claimed that only the former rules be enforced
as to them, while the new rules might be enforced against incoming students.lsa
As to less sweeping innovations of rules, or newly enforced rules, or new
interpretations of rules, the adequate advance notice would be actual notice of
the requirement before the act leading to the attempt at enforcement.180 Nuila
poena sine lege is termed a principle of natural justice because its violation, in
any context, shocks the conscience of society. Proof of fair warning of rules,
through detailed publication of requirements, might be taken in lieu of actual
notice.187 But the sudden enforcement without announcement of a change of
school policy, of a purely formal or ritual rule, or one long sunken in desuetude
should be taken as equivalent to enforcement of an unannounced rule. In sum,
reasonableness requires not only that the rules conform to academic or school
purposes, but also that they be known to the student at the relevant time for his
decision on future conduct.
C. Reasonable Rules: Limits on Enforccmcnt
The insistance upon suitable warning of the circumstances in which expul-
sion may be imposed is a procedural limit upon rule promulgation; the doctrine
of reasonable application of reasonable rules seems to call for other procedural
limitations, in which needs of both school and student are to be considered, to
govern rule enforcement. An administrator might be impelled to suggest that
the university's interest is in utilizing the most expedient route to expulsion.
But -those who administer a system must resist the tendency to confuse that
which makes their jobs easier with that which furthers the goals of the institu-
tion. Both school and student share an interest in an inquiry which is fair, can
185. See Letter to the Yale Law Journal from Ralph S. Levine, Chairman, Community
Council, Bard College, Jan. 15, 1962.
186. Even the appellate courts in St. JohW's University case, notes 7 and 173 supra,
did not hold that notice of rules was not necessary, but that the students there had actual
kmowledge of them. See Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of La-.
The Right to Judicial Review, 34 J. HIGHRm ED. 250 (1963).
187. Cf. United States v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) and cases cited note 182 supra.
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be seen to be fair, and can be relied upon to find facts accurately. The proce-
dures to be required for any given form of expulsion will, of course, depend
upon a multitude of factors, including the purpose of the university action and
its anticipated effect on the student expelled. But an inquiry into procedures,
a matter particularly within the understanding of courts, seems properly to ex-
tend to non-punitive expulsions as well as to punitive ones, despite the linita-
tion of review "on the merits" which stems from the courts' lack of expertise
in some areas of school concern.
Of several factors relevant to the issue of "reasonable" procedure at inquiries
leading to expulsion, the first is the nature of the fact which the inquiry was
intended to discover. Expulsion for reasons of punishment, deterrence, protec-
tion of others, or expiation of guilt, are properly based on a decision as to his-
torical facts and require specific inquiry into those facts; expulsions for medical,
psychiatric, or other therapeutic reasons will properly be based on a global pic-
ture of the entire student. While a general evaluation of a student's entire
record may properly serve to mitigate the sanction that a specificly determined
violation would otherwise demand, it would shock our notions of justice to al-
low the imposition of a sanction on the basis of such a general evaluation, ill
the absence of some specifically proven violation.
A second factor to be considered is whether the inquiry was undertaken by
those persons and in that manner which are recognized as being appropriate
to the form on inquiry. Different forms of investigation are appropriate to dif-
ferent matters--examinations to find academic achievement, hearings to ascer-
tain the historical facts of human conduct, psychological or medical tests and
interviews to evaluate danger to the environment. For an inquiry to be deemed
a reasonable procedure on which to base the imposition of the major sanction
of expulsion, a decision involving educational questions should be made by
educators. One involving the school as a functioning community should be
made by a cross-section of those concerned with its proper functioning-argu-
ably this would include administrators, faculty, and students. A decision as to
plagiarism should be made by scholars in that field, who have compared the
similar works; a hearing on alleged misbehavior, by men other than the accusers,
who hear both sides of the case; a psychiatric evaluation, by a professional ill
accord with professional standards.
In many cases no factual inquiry of any sort seems to be needed, since the
identification and actions of an accused student are not disputed by him. To
insure that the absence of challenge by the student actually represents confir-
mation by him of the university's version of the incident in question, however,
a court might require that he be allowed counsel by some mature advisor-
whether teacher, parent, or lawyer-before a waiver of the appropriateness of
factual inquiry is accepted as final. The mere facts as to the specific incident
authorizing sanction, moreover, are not the sole objects of consideration by the
school authorities. All matters pertinent to the decision on sanction or treatment
should also, of course, be considered before decision is made, and the student
and his adviser should be allowed to insure that the absence of a hearing as to
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the specific incident does not lead to the use of unreliable collateral information,
or the ignoring of relevant data in the subsequent decision on treatment or
punishment.
If the procedure is based on diagnosis and treatment, only the professional
standards of appropriate therapeutic roles should be enforced by courts on the
school disciplinary procedures, 88 to encourage university autonomy in choos-
ing among such appropriate professional procedures. 80 The usual benefits of
charges and adversary hearing bear little relevance to a therapeutic relationship.
Nor does the principle that deprivations may not be imposed on one who has not
committed a violation of regulations. The student's freedom may, of course, be
greatly infringed by the school's involvement with intimate personality or be-
havior problems, but the school's action may be permitted by the court because
it constitutes desirable educational guidance. The minimum judicially enforce-
able standards for protection of the interests of one involved in a process of
counseling and rehabilitation would seem to be that the treated person volun-
tarily involves himself in the therapeutic relationship, that the decisions on treat-
ment be made by qualified personnel, that they base their decisions on informa-
tion accepted in their profession as adequate, and that the treatment be within
the accepted techniques of the profession. These standards would reject as un-
reasonable, for example, punishment inflicted by untrained persons in the guise
of treatment, or for reasons other than the student's welfare, or using palpably
unacceptable techniques of control.
Concern with preventing individual arbitrariness might lead a court to require
some sort of review "on the merits" of deprivations inflicted in the name of
diagnosis and therapy. Were a college or group of colleges to set up an outside
review panel of the sort used by some medical associations to review malprac-
tice claims, no other court supervision would be needed. 10 A court might well
encourage such professional review rather than a conflict-oriented system of
188. Thus, under these standards, when school discipline is employed for moral educa-
tion or psychological rehabilitation, the university would be allowed to utilize reports of
specific incidents of rule violations to give it clues as to which students require special
guidance. And after a student had been called to the attention of the school authorities,
they could also, without violating the criterion of "reasonableness," use interviews and the
reports of persons with close personal knowledge of the student--other students, coun-
selors, teachers, and family-as well as such available data as records of psychological
examinations the student had taken, academic records, memoranda of past interviews with
the student, and the like. Even were the student found not to have committed the recent
behavior charged against him, the therapist's decision on a review of all the information
that the student has a need for special treatment-even involving withdrawal from school
-would not be condemnable as unreasonable deprivation.
189. For one possible form of a disciplinary system with nonpunitive orientation, see
generally W=LAmsox & FOLEY, CouNsELING Am DisciPpxra (1949).
190. Committee A of the American Association of University Professors has played
a somewhat similar role in investigating alleged violations of academic freedom to deter-
mine whether faculty dismissals were for acceptable cause or were violations of profes-
sional standards. And student officials of the U.S. National Student Association, on in-
vitation of a college's administration, student government, or student body, will investigate
and report on alleged school violation of student's rights.
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punishment and appeal, because it would emphasize the shared interests of
school, student, and court in the proper treatment of the student. An organiza-
tion, or an ad hoc committee, selected by a school, would likely be an impartial
and skilled review board. Certainly if it were accepted by both school and stu-
dent, a court should grant to the decisions of such a group at least the respect
given to the decisions of commercial arbitrators, rather than itself attempting
review on the substance.
In a procedure looking towards ultimate imposition of punishment for specific
offenses, on the other hand, procedures designed to produce reliable factual in-
formation are requisite.191 In defining the minimum content of such a standard,
a court has in its own experience resources superior to the schools. Drawing
upon the lessons of this experience, a court might well choose the following
principles as minimum procedural standards for university discipline, to insure
fair and reliable fact-finding. 192 The decision is to be made by some impartial
tribunal, deciding only on the basis of evidence heard by it during its hearings.
To allow him to prepare a defense, the student should be given notice of the
hearings, sufficient time, a specific statement of charges, and warning of the
serious consequences that might ensue. Because of his unequal position the stu-
dent should be allowed counsel-parent, friend, lawyer, or faculty member of
his choice. So that the panel might hear both sides of the matter, the student
should be allowed to present evidence and utilize the compulsion of school
authority to summon students or staff as witnesses. To expose fraud, mistake,
half-truth or conspiracy, the student should know the evidence against him,
know the names of the persons giving it, be given a chance to rebut it, and be
allowed to cross-examine adverse witnesses. As a final guarantee of reasoned
decision, the tribunal should make specific findings of fact and recommended
conclusions, to which the student should have the opportunity to prepare objec-
tions, before review by the highest school authorities. The exclusionary rules
employed in courts of law might be abandoned by the school tribunal in favor
of admitting improperly obtained evidence and procuring the punishment of
whatever school official obtained it; the formal evidentiary rules could be re-
placed by everyday notions of relevance and reliability. Neither of these elements
of court procedure are required by the fact-finding function of the school tri-
bunal. Nor would use of a jury be demanded by the dictates of reliable fact-
finding. The hearing need not be public if the student involved prefers privacy.'0 3
191. As an alternative, the court could itself conduct de novo hearings on the ultimate
issue. See White v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass. 162, 174 N.E. 187 (1931), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 611 (1932) (court-appointed master found facts as to student misbehavior which
led to expulsion; on the basis of his finding, court determined the expulsion to be justifi-
able).
192. See note 13 supra.
193. It would be an absurdity to proscribe a public hearing in the case of a delinquent
child on the one hand, and on the other to require it where a child merely infracted
a school rule, subjecting such child to all the attendant, deleterious effects which
trained observors have discovered usually follow such hearings.
Mando v. Wesleyville School Dist., 81 Pa. D. & C. 125, 128 (1952).
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However, the maxim that "not only must justice be done, it must be made to
appear to be done," generally-accepted notions of fair play, and recognition that
students share with faculty and administration a concern with the best interests
of the school, would suggest that responsible students be included as part of
the school adjudicating process.1 94
Finally, a third factor for the court to weigh, in addition to the nature of the
facts to be found and the suitability of the inquiry for finding them, is whether
the procedure followed corresponded in care to the importance of the matter
decided. Contestation of allegations of historical fact, the resolution of which
will determine an expulsion, is a serious matter which should receive full and
serious consideration-more expenditure of care and deliberation than an un-
contested matter or a lesser sanction would require. And expulsion from a pro-
fessional school, or expulsion with notation of dishonorable character, or other
sanctions especially likely to cut off the student's chances for continuation of
similar education and work elsewhere, are even more serious than ordinary
expulsions and would require even higher standards of care in deliberation be-
fore imposition.
CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS ON AN INSTITUTIONAL BASIS
The factors discussed above as relevant to procedural and substantive stand-
ards do not mention any distinction between "state" and "private" colleges. To
some this may seem strange. The distinction between the two is common to
everyday language, and has long been assumed by the courts. And the charac-
terization of an institution as "state" has been useful in extending constitutional
protections to persons affected by actions of other than the traditional execu-
tive, legislative and judicial actors. But the standards here developed are based
on the natures of universities and their students-and a school is as much a
school whether it be named "state" or not.195 State schools today do not differ
as a class from private schools in terms of size, organization, purpose, quality,
or other relevant factors. Those differences which do exist are few, and of little
functional importance. One is that state schools generally do not find their
major source of income in endowment revenues and student fees, but in annual
grants from a single institutional donor-which is the state legislature. A second
is that the institutional founder of the state university has shaped its purposes--
often historically, that it emphasize agriculture and mechanical arts and univer-
sally even today, that it be secular. A third is that-for most of those state
schools not established by state constitution as a "fourth" and independent
branch of government-the university board is subject to some degree of con-
194. Vhile consideration- of the values of an honor system are beyond the scope of this
Comment, to the extent that such systems are relied upon, to find the facts of alleged rule
violations they fall within, the analysis here presented. The special characteristics of an
honor system can not substitute for the protections of due process, but a university might
provide these protections through such a format.
195. See generally THE CommmEE ox GovEzmrxaNT AND HiGHER EDUCATIo:, THE
Ewci xcy op FRE.oM (1959).
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trol by a higher board, the legislature. But these differences between state and
private universities are of degree and not of kind. They do not alter the task
of weighing competing school and student interests which is necessary to pro-
vide content for the standard of reasonableness by which to judge expulsion.
The same set of factors which determine that standard in the public college
situation are at work also in the private. The result reached by weighing the
factors will, of course, vary with the specific purposes, procedures, alternatives,
costs, and goals involved in each expulsion. A state school, equally with a pri-
vate school, should not be made to follow the rigid formalities or stereotyped
doctrines sometimes used for testing the propriety of actions of courts and other
agencies of state government. But the value placed by society on accuracy in
fact-finding before punishment, on fairness, on freedom for the individual, ap-
plies as strongly to the private college student as to his brother at a state school.
The value placed by society on the academic freedom and institutional autonomy
of the university faculty should be accepted as applying to the state school
equally with the private.19 To the extent that a school-state or private-is
functionally a government, our social values demand that standards be imposed
on the discretion of administrators-state or private-to protect justice and
liberty in the school community.
196. Our view is that in a democracy, all advance censorship, except that demanded by
law and enforced in the courts (such as prosecutions of clearly obscene material)
should be resisted with vigilance....
We believe that this applies to all institutions of higher education, as well as to
democracy generally, and especially to public institutions supported by public funds
All these restrictions [censorship of student political groups, political speakers,
and writings on controversial subjects] defeat academic freedom. They also effec-
tively defeat the freedoms of speech and assembly....
Report, Committee on Civil Rights, New York County Lawyer's Association, 1962, under
the chairmanship of Whitney North Seymour, Jr., former President of the American Bar
Association. (Emphasis added.)
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